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ABSTRACT 
Horror stories of ineffective nonprofit organization management arise in the media far too often.  
When these stories emerge, the public demands accountability from those responsible.  
Ultimately, accountability rests with the fiduciaries of the organization.  For nonprofit 
organizations in the United States, fiduciary responsibility and accountability reside with the 
board of directors.    
Board governance has been widely studied in the for-profit sector.  Due to the critical 
nature of the work nonprofits perform, there has been an increasing effort to study board 
governance in nonprofit organizations.  Employing in depth interviews, with both executive 
directors and board members, checks and safeguards such as contracts, performance review, and 
monitoring were examined.  What began as an exploration of two-competing theories (Agency 
Theory and Stewardship Theory), resulted in the unmasking of the subtlety of effective 
governance (both contractual and socio-relational), the illusory promises of formalization, and a 
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In a case study highlighted by Libby & Deitrick (2017), the importance of proper board 
oversight is seen clearly.  A board member of a prominent ballet company reported that, while at 
the airport and returning from a 3-week vacation, she received a phone call from a local reporter.  
The reporter found the board member’s contact information through an online search and wanted 
to know why the ballet was closing.  Moreover, the reporter wanted to know why the executive 
director was being given hundreds of thousands of dollars in severance while many instructors 
and students were going to find themselves unemployed. 
The board member being asked responded (unwisely, it turns out) that she was unaware 
of any closure.  She reported being gone for 3 weeks, missing only a single board meeting, and 
that closure was not being discussed when she had left.  She admitted that the ballet company 
struggled financially, but not so much that it would close.  She was aware, however, that the 
executive director planned on retiring the next year.  She was not prepared for the media 
onslaught that followed.  She had been left in the dark and was about to be blinded by an ugly 
truth. 
Within days, it became clear.  There had been a board meeting while she was on 
vacation.  In that meeting, 25 of 47 board members attended.  A case was made by the executive 
committee to close the ballet’s doors rather than face possible bankruptcy the next year.  It 
turned out the executive director had been the one who recommended closure instead of 
attempting to make up the $1 million budget shortfall.  With only a fraction of the board present, 
but enough to meet quorum requirements, the board voted to close the ballet.  While the 




was closing would trigger the severance clause in his contract.  This was worth 450,000 dollars 
(Libby & Deitrick, 2017). 
Nonprofit organizations share many characteristics with conventional corporations.  
However, they present unique sets of challenges as well.  Greatest among these challenges 
relates to the fiduciary responsibilities of the board of directors and their relationship to the 
executive director.  Aligning the interests of board members (principals) and their executive 
directors (agents) is critical, but unlike for-profit corporations, nonprofit corporations do not 
have the ability to align stakeholders’ interests through issuing stock in the corporation. 
 
501 (c) 3 Nonprofit Organizations 
The first step to addressing nonprofit-board management is to define the sector.  It is 
worth noting that nonprofit organizations are defined differently in the United States than they 
are internationally.  For the purposes of this examination, we will begin with a review of the 
definitions put forward in the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax code. 
 
The exempt purposes set forth in section 501I (3) are charitable, religious, educational, 
scientific, literary, testing for public safety, fostering national or international amateur 
sports competition, and preventing cruelty to children or animals.  The term charitable is 
used in its generally accepted legal sense and includes relief of the poor, the distressed, or 
the underprivileged; advancement of religion; advancement of education or science; 
erecting or maintaining public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening the burdens of 




defending human and civil rights secured by law; and combating community 
deterioration and juvenile delinquency.  
         www.irs.gov 
 
 Churches, colleges, food banks, parent teacher organizations, museums, the Automobile 
Association of America (AAA), credit unions, and little leagues (among many others) all fit into 
this very broad basket.  The term “nonprofit” applies unequivocally to them all and yet their role, 
function, and operation are widely different.  From this point forward, we will constrain the topic 
to discuss Hansmann’s definition of “true” nonprofits: 
“True” nonprofits – that is firms, first that are formally organized as either nonprofit 
corporations or charitable trusts.  These organizations are all characterized by the fact that 
they are subject, by the laws of the state in which they were formed, to a constraint-which 
I call the “non-distribution constraint”- that prohibits the distribution of residual earnings 
to individuals who exercise control over the firm, such as officers, directors, or members.   
Note that nonprofits are not prohibited from earning profits: rather, they must simply 
devote any surplus to financing future services or distribute it to non-controlling persons. 
        (Hansmann, 1987, p. 28) 
 
 There are two forms of intra-organizational structure a nonprofit organization can 
assume.  In one form, the board chair/president takes on the role and responsibilities of the 
executive director.  Often, these organizations are run entirely in-house and often have very 
small annual budgets (Bernstein, Buse, & Slatten, 2015).  Board members perform most, if not 




 In the second form, typically used in larger organizations, the board maintains fiduciary 
responsibilities, but hires an executive director to carry out the strategic initiatives of the board.  
The executive directors are hired, recruited, and evaluated by the board (Bernstein, Buse, & 
Slatten, 2015).  This form, most common among medium and large agencies, is of primary 
interest in this paper. 
The board of directors of a nonprofit organization is responsible for executing the 
organization’s mission while observing responsibilities of loyalty, care, and obedience 
(Bernstein, Buse, & Slatten, 2015).  It is the board’s obligation to interpret the mission of the 
organization as established by the founder or amended by the board and to consider the public’s 
benefit at all times (Gassler, 1986).  These roles and responsibilities, while held by the board, are 
generally delegated to an executive director who oversees the day-to-day responsibilities of 
managing the organization (Manzetti & Mehta, 2015).  Fidelity of communication between the 
















Numerous theories have been applied to the study of the behavior of boards and 
executive officers.  In the for-profit space, these have included Agency Theory, Resource 
Dependency Theory, Institutional Theory, Stakeholder Theory, Shareholder Theory, Prospect 
Theory, and Behavioral Decision Theory.  In the nonprofit space, theories applied have included 
Agency Theory, Resource Dependency Theory, Institutional Theory, Contingency Theory, and 
Stewardship Theory.  One theory worth noting from public administration that will be discussed 
in this paper is Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Theory of policy formation (Kingdon, 1995).  Each 
is a unique lens deployed to examine and make sense of diverse observational data. 
Many of the theories commonly applied to conventional for-profit firms are applicable in 
the nonprofit sector since, sans their special-tax designation, the challenges of existing in 
competitive environments remain similar (Gassler, 1986; Forbes & Milliken, 1999).  There are 
significant differences in purpose for which not-for-profit and for-profit businesses are created.  
Each deserves an analysis sensitive to these distinctions (Green & Griesinger, 1996).  
Furthermore, a variety of incongruencies arise from the lack of shareholders and nonprofit 
organizations’ inability to sell stock as a means of accessing capital markets (Gassler, 1986). 
 What follows is a series of theories that have been applied in the nonprofit space to 
account for the behaviors of nonprofit boards of directors.  They vary in specificity relative to 
aspects of board performance.  They share a common focus on attempting to explain 
organizational performance or organizational efficiency and how it relates to board practices. 






 In 2006, Ostrower and Stone (2006) compiled a literature review of economic theories as 
applied to the nonprofit sector at that time.  While many theories were discussed, the three major 
themes were summarized in the following table: 
 
Table 1 Theory Summary (Miller-Millensen 2003 pgs. 530-531) 
Theoretical 
framework 




















Focus is on 
monitoring 
managerial action 
to assure activities 
increase 
shareholder wealth 
Emphasis is placed on 
the board’s role in 
developing the 






Emphasis is placed 
on using financial 
indicators to assess 
program 
effectiveness 
Focus is on 
establishing program 
evaluation criteria to 
assure that existing 
and proposed 
programs reflect 
mission and purpose 











satisfaction with the 
chief executive’s 
actions in support of 
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providing insight 
regarding critical 
actions such as 
acquisitions, 
divestitures, or 
takeover bids  
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translating the mission 
and purpose into 









such as market 
share, return on 
investment, and 
profit 
Focus on monitoring 
resource allocation 
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with the requisite 
knowledge to 
contribute to the 
governance process 
Provide adequate 
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access to cash 
Focus is on boundary-
spanning functions to 






















Assure that basic 
legal and ethical 
responsibilities 
are fulfilled 




Adhere to legal 










Agency Theory emerged from academic explorations of the challenges associated with 
risk-sharing enterprises and organizational structures in the late-1960s (Eisenhardt, 1989).  The 
setting for Agency Theory application occurs “when cooperating parties have different goals and 
division of labor” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 58).  Parties that do the delegating are called 
“Principals,” while those carrying out the delegated work are called “Agents” (Shapiro, 2005).  
Agency Theory addresses the challenges that come on the principal-side and on the agent-side by 
stating: 
The first is the agency problem that arises when (a) the desires or goals of the principal 
and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the 
agent is actually doing.     




The relationship between principals and agents can spark conflict between goals and 
desires.   Risk-sharing, risk-seeking, and risk-averse preferences lead to the possibility of making 
different decisions with the same variables being considered by two separate actors with 
different motivations.  As subsequently noted by Eisenhardt: 
The second is the problem of risk sharing that arises when the principal and agent have 
different attitudes toward risk.  The problem here is that the principal and the agent may 
prefer different actions because of different risk preferences. 
        (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 58) 
 
When applied to nonprofits, or any firm, Agency Theory quickly becomes somewhat 
muddled in that there are arguably multiple principals and diverse agents (Van Puyvelde et al., 
2012; Hopt & Von Hippel, 2010).  As Shapiro expresses in a summary of Agency Theory: 
The assumption of a solitary principal and agent is invariably extended to include 
multiple principals and agents. This is not just a matter of verisimilitude. Theories 
become much more complex (and interesting) when they allow for the possibility that 
collections or teams of principals (or agents) disagree or compete over interests and 
goals, feature of agency relationships Adams (1996) dubs the “Hydra factor.” 
        (Shapiro, 2005, p. 267) 
Notwithstanding the unsavoriness of the ballet company case study, many non-profits 
function without contracts.  Nonprofits are a strange breed.  In comparison to for-profits, which 
focus on maximizing profit for shareholders, public agencies seek to maximize voter-identified 
values and interests while maximizing equity and fairness (Denhardt, 2004).  Nonprofits are 




suffer from many of the same problems as for-profit businesses such as personnel management 
and/or cash liquidity concerns.  On the other hand, they have fewer means to fund the solutions 
to those problems due to the inherent lack of profitability in the work they perform (Dolnicar, 
Irvine, & Lazarevski, 2008). 
Besides Agency Theory, other theories seek to explain why boards act the way they do. 
These include Resource-Dependency Theory, Institutional Theory, and Stewardship theory.  
While each will be subsequently reviewed, Stewardship Theory stands in stark contrast to 
Agency Theory.  Stewardship Theory acknowledges that sometimes people are good on their 
own.  People often have the integrity and intrinsic motivation to fulfill obligations for 
performance and production.  When thinking about local Girl Scout troops, little leagues, and 
animal care nonprofits, these instances are perhaps far more common and cannot be easily 
explained by the arguably more cynical – Agency Theory.  
 
Resource-Dependency Theory  
Resource Dependency Theory is useful when analyzing an organization’s behavior within 
the context of its overall environment.  With regards to this particular study, which focuses on 
the attitudes of executive directors and their boards of directors, it is less-desirous to use this 
particular framework. 
Interests are the motivations that are derived from values (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991).  
What is valued is highly dependent upon the perception of the overall goals of the agency.  The 
value of any particular resource relates to its scarcity, necessity, and use within the organization.  




RD rests on a few straightforward principles. First, an organization needs resources to 
survive and to pursue its goals. Second, an organization can obtain resources from its 
environment or, more simply, from other organizations. Third, power and its inverse, 
dependence, play key roles in understanding inter-organizational relationships. This last 
principle implies that the balance of power usually favors the organization that possesses 
what other organizations need. 
(Malatesta & Smith, 2014, p. 14).   
  
Institutional Theory:   
 Every organization, whether non-profit or otherwise, is subject to “internal pressures, 
rules, norms, and sactions” (Miller-Millesen, 2003, p. 522).  Institutional Theory views the 
practices of nonprofit boards through the lens of the codification-of-behaviors and practices as-
they-exist in other similar institutions.  While this theory is particularly useful when looking at 
board practices generally and across time, it places high value on the role of trust (Dimaggio & 
Anheier, 1990).  Modern Institutional Theory also includes neoinstitutionalism and consideration 
of Trust vs. Risk.  Familiar organizational structures often command greater degrees of trust, 
simply by virtue of the familiarity of their structure (Ostrower & Stone, 2009).  As Anheier 
highlights, “Trust is highly sensitive to significant violations.  In contrast to risk, which can be 
envisioned as a continuous variable, trust is binary” (Anheier, 1995, p. 20).  Since this study is 
focused on checks and safeguards, attitudes, and perceptions of mission, Institutional Theory was 






Agency, Resource Dependence, and Institutional Theory Synthesis by Miller-Millesen 
 Suffice it to say, the body of knowledge and theory surrounding nonprofit board 
governance is incomplete and given the importance of nonprofit organization, proper governance 
in a healthy society demands attention.  Citing a presentation by Ostrower and Stone, Miller-
Millesen stated in 2003:  
“There are major gaps in our theoretical and empirical knowledge” regarding nonprofit 
boards of directors. The authors acknowledged a small but growing body of research 
suggesting an increase in scholarly attention to and interest in “understanding rather than 
describing” board governance. 
(Miller-Millesen, 2003, p. 521).   
  
Selecting the proper theory for application has been challenging to say the least.  Three 
theories readily emerge to describe board behaviors.   These are Agency Theory, Resource 
Dependency Theory, and Institutional Theory (Miller-Millesen, 2003).  In summarizing the state 
of research at the time, Miller-Millesen highlights, “Each theory paints an incomplete picture of 
a highly complex phenomenon because each theory focuses on a different set of activities and 
functions” (Miller-Millesen, 2003, p. 522). 
In 2005, a board literature review regarding board management for both for-profit and 
nonprofit boards found more than 14,000 papers, 277 specifically dealing with nonprofit boards 
(Hough, 2005, p. 4).  There is an abundance of scholarly activity in the space.  Consolidating 
findings into clearer models is necessary for better understanding.  The 6 Theory Model is one 





6-Theory Model of Best Board Practices 
 Drawing from a subset of economic theories as applied to organizations’ boards 
behaviors (Hough et al., 2005), the following 6-Theory Model has been selected for specific 
application to nonprofit boards:   
 




Focus Best practice Private sector boards Nonprofit Boards 




action to assure 





Determine the mission 
and purpose 
Focus is on 
monitoring managerial 
action to assure 
activities increase 
shareholder wealth 
Emphasis is placed on 
the board’s role in 
developing the 
mission and purpose 
Approve and monitor 
the organization’s 
programs and services 
Emphasis is placed on 
using financial 
indicators to assess 
program effectiveness 
Focus is on 
establishing program 
evaluation criteria to 
assure that existing 
and proposed 
programs reflect 
mission and purpose 
Evaluate the chief 
executive’s 
performance 
Reflects the board’s 
evaluation of CEO 
contribution to 




satisfaction with the 
chief executive’s 
actions in support of 




Focus is on providing 
insight regarding 
critical actions such as 
acquisitions, 
divestitures, or 
takeover bids  
Emphasis is on 
translating the mission 
and purpose into 





policies and financial 
controls 
Monitoring financial 
indicators such as 
market share, return 
on investment, and 
profit 
Focus on monitoring 
resource allocation 







organization with its 
environment 
Identify candidates 
who can improve 
access to information 
The goal is to improve 
coordination among 
firms 
The goal is to link 
organization to 
constituent groups 
with the requisite 
knowledge to 
contribute to the 
governance process 
Provide adequate 






Focus is on boundary-
spanning functions to 





to facilitate the firm’s 




Focus in on enhancing 
reputation through 
networking 













Adhere to legal 
mandates and 
statutory requirements 




















Allow for CEOs to 
also Chair the Board 
of Directors 
Executive Directors 
who are either 
Presidents or voting 
members on the Board 
of Directors. 
Stakeholder Theory Guaranteeing the 
investments of the 
multiplicity of 
stakeholders in an 
organization. 




safeguards exist to all 
stakeholders. 
All Stakeholders are 
known and their 
interests are 
considered by the 
board. 
All Stakeholders are 
known and their 
interests are 
considered by the 
board.   
Stewardship Theory Enabling CEOs 
through additional 
power, autonomy, and 
unity of command 
Allow CEOs to also 
Chair the Board of 
Directors 
Allow for CEOs to 
also Chair the Board 
of Directors 
Executive Directors 
who are either 
Presidents or voting 
members on the Board 
of Directors. 
 
In an article reviewing and summarizing the state of nonprofit board governance theory, 
Marc Jegers concluded, “It is fair to say that a coherent economic theory on nonprofit 
governance has not yet emerged from the research” (Jegers, 2009, p. 158).  There is no unified 
theory of nonprofit management.  Certain theories work in certain operations of nonprofit 
organizations to explain their behaviors. 
While there exists a fair amount of knowledge regarding the connection between boards 
and organizational efficiency (Green & Griesinger, 1996), the internal transfer of knowledge 
between boards and their executive directors is far less well understood.  Explored to some 
extent, Miller notes: 
Most of the literature on nonprofit board governance is normative rather than 




not explicitly detailed the theoretical assumptions underpinning normative assertions 
about how a board ought to behave. It also means that different theories might be useful 
for explaining different behaviors 
(Miller, 2002, p. 430).   
 
Hypotheses Within the context of Agency and Stewardship Theory 
 Now that identifiable best practices have been established, the application of these 
practices can be predicted within two theories selected for deeper qualitative analysis.  Those 
theories are Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory.  In the table that follows, the framework 
for organizational checks and safeguarding is laid out alongside hypotheses that would be 
















Table 3 Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory Hypotheses 




Contracts Contracts will be well written, 
durable, and known to all 
parties. 
Contracts may exist, but the details may not be regularly 
reviewed or known by all parties.  Parties will express a 
sense of trust in the purpose, role, and mission of the 
organization. 
Monitoring Monitoring policies will be 
written, redundant, and 
regularly reviewed. 
Policies may or not be written, they may exist in places not 




Both board members and the 
executive director will be 
reviewed regularly.  
Performance targets will be 
pre-established and known to 
all parties. 
Performance reviews may be done unofficially, and 
reported as a general sense of an individual’s commitment 




Motivations will be primarily 
linked to contractual 
incentives. 
Motivations are likely to be mission and impact focused 
rather than pay or prestige.   Board members may report a 
personal story for their affiliation with the organization, 
rather than one of prestige. 
Recruitment 
Perspectives 
Hiring will be deliberate with 
large searches and evidences of 
previous successes, not 
alignment with the cause, will 
be primarily considered. 
Recruitment perspectives are more likely to be focused on 
passion and service, rather than skill-focused and needs-
based analyses.  Both boards and executive directors are 
likely to report passion and affinity as primary 





Boards will be larger, meet 
frequently, maintain stringent 
criteria when selecting board 
members, and isolate the CEO 
from voting.  
Boards will be smaller in size, meet infrequently, have 
informal selection criteria for new members, and the 




Organizations will be older, 
larger (by annual expenses), 
and have a paid-professional 
CEO. 
Organizations will be newer, smaller (by annual expenses), 
and may have an unpaid/undercompensated CEO relative 




Organization will subject itself 
to multiple audits (State and 
Third Party), and will include 
diversified and stringent 
funding sources including 
Federal, State, and Local grant 
sources. 
Organization may or may not participate in an annual audit 
of its financial statements.  Sources will be less formalized 
and diversified.  More stringent funding sources may not 
be sought.   
 
Behavioral Agency Modeling (BAM) 
 As highlighted by Pepper and Gore (2015), Behavioral Agency Modeling builds upon the 
works of early Agency Theorists like Spencer and Zeckhauser (Spence & Zeckhauser, 1971), 
Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt, 1989), and Jensen and Meckling (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) (Pepper & 
Gore, 2015).  Combining portions of Agency Theory with Prospect Theory (Gomez-Mejia & 




within any organization, this theory is necessary to appreciate later findings in this research.  As 
Pepper and Gore (2015) highlight: 
In contrast to the standard agency framework, which focuses on monitoring costs and 
incentive alignment, behavioral agency theory places agent performance and work 
motivation at the center of the agency model, arguing that the interests of shareholders 
and their agents are most likely to be aligned if executives are motivated to perform to the 
best of their abilities, given the available opportunities. 
       (Pepper & Gore, 2015, p. 1046) 
 
 It must not be missed that there are core assumptions at play in positive Agency Theory 
that are not applicable in this particular research.  For example, primary assumptions of Agency 
Theory as generally applied by business management scholars and Organization Theory scholars 
are that “organizations are profit seeking, that agents are both rational and rent seeking, and that 
there is no nonpecuniary agent motivation” (Pepper & Gore, 2015, p. 1047).  Clearly, in 
nonprofit organizations, profit cannot be said to be the goal of the principal in the principal/agent 
relationship.  Agency cost is identical in all regards.  “The sum of the monitoring expenditures of 
the principal, the bonding expenditures of the agent, and the residual loss in welfare experienced 
by the principal as a result of the divergence of interests between the principal and the agent” 
(Pepper & Gore, 2015, p. 1048).  Clearly, agency cost is a factor in nonprofit governance as well. 
  
Kindgon’s Multiple Streams Theory 
 Another theory that will be necessary to understand the findings later in the research 




Garbage Can Model initially put forward by Cohen, Olsen, and March (1972),  Kingdon’s 
Multiple Streams Approach (MSA) advances understanding of policy choice.  MSA holds that in 
any given political sphere, there are concurrent streams of possible problems to solve, possible 
solutions to those problems, and varying political resources to accomplish political changes 
(Henstra, 2010).  Occasionally, leaders or “policy entrepreneurs” as described by Kingdon 
(1995), will emerge as managers to successfully merge those 3-concurrently flowing streams.  
This results in policy change during the opening of what Kindgon (1995) describes as a “policy 
window” (Sabatier, 2007).  
  
 In a study by Jones et al (2016), MSA research applications from 2000-2015 were 
analyzed in a meta-review.  The framework was developed to understand and explain the 
emergence of policy in “organized anarchies” (Jones et al., 2016).  Initially, this model was 
applied to Federal Congressional Policy (Henstra, 2010).  In the nearly twenty years since, MSA 
has been applied in “65 different countries, at multiple levels of governance, across 22 different 
policy areas, and by researches spanning the globe” (Jones et al., 2016, p. 13). While MSA has 
become increasingly popular and has been applied across a vast area of tenable areas of research 
interest, it has not yet been applied in the space of nonprofit board governance.  It’s application 
in this research is a first.  
 
Checks and Safeguards 
 Contracts, Monitoring, and Performance Review are all methods of maintaining checks 




consequences if contractual obligations are not met are informative of an organization’s view 
and treatment of contracts as a check and safeguard (Anthony, 1980).   
 Monitoring methods, including regularity and redundancy, are critical to consider when 
analyzing an organization’s commitment to internal administrative checks and safeguards.  
Whether these policies are written, reviewable, and widely known will inform whether or not 
monitoring is occurring effectively and regularly as well as whether it serves as an actual check 
and safeguard in the organization (Bushman, Injejikian, & Smith, 1996).  
Of the three primary sectors of our economy (public, private, and nonprofit), it is the 
nonprofit sector that is least understood and arguably the most difficult to manage (Bernstein et 
al., 2015).   On one hand, board members serve as fiduciaries of the public and are charged with 
the duties of loyalty, care, and obedience (Herman & Renz, 2000).  Each of these duties require 
accurate and timely information to verify compliance.  While the duties of loyalty can be self-
policed with an active board and a well-written Conflict-of-Interest Policy (Bhandari, 2010), the 
Duties of Care and Obedience are more complicated (Bhandari, 2010).  The Duty of Obedience 
require subservience to law and regulation.  It is in the Duty of Care where communication of 
effective checks and safeguards is placed under the greatest strain (Hazen, 2012). 
 
Attitudes 
As Peter Drucker elaborated in 1989, “The businesses I work with start their planning 
with financial returns...the nonprofits start with the performance of their mission” (Drucker, 
1989, p. 1). Drucker further elaborated on the challenges this creates in managing nonprofits 
when he was cited by the University of Florida in their The Third Sector Blog, “Nonprofits need 




their mission and their ‘product’ has to be clearly defined and constantly assessed” (The Third 
Sector, 2008, p. 1). This recognition presents both challenges and opportunities. 
According to Silva (2005), motivations matter.   Not only do motivations matter to 
executive officers, but the board motivation is an important component of organizational 
performance (Bushman, Injejikian, & Smith, 1996).  In the Silva study, seven questions were 
asked.  The questions built upon an earlier job satisfaction study developed by Hackman and 
Oldham (Hackman & Oldham, 1975).   
Four categories of Independent variables were analyzed in the Silva model.  These 
included: 1. Ownership, as measured by whether the board was issued stock options; 2. Stock 
value-if the board was issued stock options;  3. Board salary; and  4. Board motivation. Since 
nonprofit organizations are unable to issue stock, and board members are not allowed to profit 
from membership in any way, the first three measures are not applicable to nonprofit boards.  
The fourth measure (the level of perceived involvement and perception of importance) is directly 
applicable (Silva, 2005).  Silva (2005) utilized the following seven (7) questions, adapted from 
the Hackman & Oldham Diagnostic instrument, in their study: 
 
1. Most decisions made by the board of directors are completely independent from 
CEO intervention. 
2. I feel that my participation in board decision making is valued by my board 
members. 
3. The CEO’s opinion in board discussions is integral to the discussions of board 
members.  




5. The decisions I make significantly affect the lives and well-being of others. 
6. I have a lot of autonomy in my job as a board member. I have a lot of freedom in 
doing my work. 
7. My job as a board member gives me many chances to use my personal initiative 
or judgment in carrying out my duties. 
(Silva, 2005, p. 352) 
 
Structural Variables  
 Certain structural variables should be considered when analyzing the checks and 
safeguards, attitudes, and flow of information within an organization.  As Ostrower and Stone 
(2009, p. 7) delineated below:   
 
Table 4 Board Characteristics (Ostrower and Stone 2009, pg 7) 
Categories of Independent Variables 




Number of voting members 
(board size) 
Age Field of Activity (Culture, 
Education, Health, Human 
Services, Other) 
Number of board meetings 
per year 
Size (annual expenses) Percentage of Funding from 
various sources including 
government, foundations, 
individuals, fees, endowment 
Board Composition 
-Is the CEO a voting board 
member 





-Percentage employed by 
business 
Professionalization (has a 
CEO that is a paid 
professional staff member) 
Is the organization subject to 




Do organizational members 
elect one or more members? 
Is the organization in a period 
of change? 
 






Given the local focus and prioritization for this research, the known state of the Nonprofit 
Sector Governance and Connectedness in Southern Nevada is worth mentioning.  In a study 
commissioned by the Lincy Institute, and led by Dr. Monnat, a Social Network Census was 
performed on Social-Sector Nonprofits active in Southern Nevada.  Social Network Analyses are 
increasingly utilized to support a variety of economic efforts worldwide.  As highlighted in the 
report by Dr. Monnat: 
 
Social network analysis provides information about both the structure of the non‐profit 
network as a whole as well as the positions of individual organizations within the 
network. Network analysis enables us to determine the most well‐connected and 
influential organizations within a network as well as the overall cohesiveness of the 
network. 
       (Monnat & Smedley, 2013, p. 11) 
 
Being well-positioned in the network represents access to knowledge and resources.  
Given resource scarcity in the social sector, this is key for getting things done without the 
presence of slack resources in the system.  The study began with the recognition of need.  As 




There is a need within southern Nevada to manage non‐profit organizations efficiently 
and effectively and to augment non‐profit organizations’ abilities to build adaptive 
programs, and successfully compete for federal and foundational grant funding, and 
effectively serve the residents of southern Nevada.      
      (Monnat & Smedley, 2013, p. 5) 
 
 The Monnat Study uncovered numerous challenges to developing the goal of a well-
integrated, effective, and well-resourced nonprofit sector in Southern Nevada.  These included 
 “territoriality, silos, and competition; the need for knowledge and training; concern about the 
lack of data availability and usage; the desire for more opportunities for meeting and networking; 
critiques of leadership” (Monnat & Smedley, 2013, p. 26).  Nevertheless, the study emphasizes 
that, despite the challenges, there remain “reflections of hope and promise for the non‐profit 
community in southern Nevada” (Monnat & Smedley, 2013, p. 26). 
 
Research Question:  Agency Theory or Stewardship Theory:  Which Best Accounts for the 
Practices and Perspectives Within Select Nonprofit Organizations?  
Nonprofit boards have tremendous leeway when structuring the relationship between 
themselves and the executive directors they manage.  The board has the authority and duty to 
motivate the executive director to accomplish agency goals toward the fulfillment of its mission.  
This can take the form of rigid contracts, regular-written evaluations, and tiered-bonus 
incentives.  Alternatively, it can take the form of high-levels of delegated authority, handshake 




After reviewing possible methodological approaches, Grounded Theory quickly appealed 
as the forerunner most likely to deliver salient and useful inductive insight into a gap in the 
literature.  Still, as highlighted by Bowen (2005), in some cases the best selection is Grounded 
Theory with case studies becoming the product, rather than the method of the research. Built 
upon formal theories, Non-Positivist Grounded Theory is best able to “springboard” this research 
forward and generate new theory (Strauss & Glaser, 1967, p. 95). 
Bowen on trustworthiness, citing Denzin and Lincoln regarding four factors that should 
be considered when examining trustworthiness include: “credibility, transferability, 
dependability, and confirmability” (Bowen, 2005, p. 214).  Trustworthiness is thus presented 
credibly when research seeks to establish some or all of the following: prolonged engagement, 
triangulation, document review, peer debriefing and support, member checking, negative case 

















Several different sampling techniques were considered for this dissertation.  Initially, 
stratified random sampling was considered.  In this approach, organization lists would be 
downloaded from the IRS database of registered, geographically constrained, and income-ranked 
nonprofit organizations.  Problems with this approach included inclusion of small nonprofits 
with highly variable structure, size, impact, and area of service (i.e. little leagues and parent 
teacher associations).  Additional challenges would include lack of presence of agencies 
headquartered and federally registered in other states (e.g., ALA or AMA, etc.) which have 
significant capacity and program activity locally, but would be lost when the samples were 
geographically bounded using IRS databases.   
 
Bounded-selection 
 Upon reviewing IRS form-990 filings for all agencies identified as over-performing 
agencies in the area of degree-centrality, 10 agencies were considered for inclusion in this study.  
Four of these agencies were associated primarily with resource development (i.e., fundraising).  
As the author is primarily interested in studying direct practice agencies and their performance, 
non-direct service agencies were excluded.  The remaining six-agencies form a diverse pool from 
which to begin a qualitative analysis.  Two additional agencies of comparable size were added to 
achieve a sampling of 8 agencies.  These agencies were assured confidentiality in their 
participation and are thus not named herein.   
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was obtained for the following instrument 




executive directors of the nonprofits selected.  In-person recorded interviews were conducted 
with the executive directors.  Second-round interviews were then conducted with the board 
member most closely associated with overseeing contracting, monitoring, and performance 
review.  These were allowed to include the President (or its equivalent), Vice-President (or its 
equivalent), and Treasurer/Secretary (or its/their equivalent), or any Member of the Boards of 
these agencies. Consent to be recorded and advisement of anonymity were provided and obtained 
to all survey participants prior to being interviewed. Qualitative data obtained from the 
interviews were transcribed and analyzed to identify emergent themes.  All records relating to 
this research are kept in a locked office and will be destroyed 2-years from publication. 
Additional quantitative data, obtained through Guidestar filings, will be evaluated for 
descriptive comparison.  These will include information about the following:  Founding year, 
number of paid and unpaid employees, annual revenue, trends over time from 990 for past three 
filing years, and simple efficiency (revenue vs overhead). 
 
Survey Instrument 1 Executive Director Interview 
[Interviewer: “This is the Introduction:  Many of the questions I’m about to ask 
are open ended.  Please elaborate where possible.  The goal is to explore 
organizational checks and safeguards: such as contracts, monitoring, and 
performance review.  This will be compared with other agencies that, like your 
agency, scored above-expectations in degree centrality on the Social Network 
Analysis Census conducted by the Lincy Institute 2-years ago. 
Some questions are broad and you may answer them as broadly as you wish.  




specifically as you wish.  You may decline to answer any questions you don’t feel 
comfortable answering.  You may end the survey anytime.  We expect it will less 
than one-hour to complete.  Do you consent to taking this survey?  If so, Please 
sign these forms (present informed consent documentation and authorization to be 
recorded). 
Executive Director 
1) Checks and Safeguards: 
a) Contracts  
i) Standard questions: 
(1) What contracts exist within this organization? 
(2) How were they created? 
(3) Who, on the board, is responsible for overseeing them? 
(4) How are individuals held accountable in these contracts? 
(5) Would you make them available for this study? 
ii) Possible follow-up questions: 
(1) Does your organization have written job responsibilities for both the Executive 
Director and Board Members? 
(2) Do you have a written contract? 




(3) Do you have a vote on the board? 
(4) Does your organization have a written conflict of interest policy? 
(a) In your own words, being as specific as possible, what does it detail? 
b) Monitoring 
i) Standard questions: 
(1) How is your performance as an Executive Director monitored by the board?  
Please elaborate.  
ii) Possible follow-up questions:   
(1) Is your performance as an Executive Director monitored? 
(a) What is monitored? 
(2) In what ways are those (restate responses) monitored? 
(3) What do you hold yourself accountable to produce, that no one checks on? 
(4) Who determined what measures you’re held accountable for producing? 
c) Performance Review 
i) Standard Questions 
(1) How is your performance reviewed at your organization?  Please elaborate. 
ii) Possible follow-up questions: 
(1) Is there a written policy for how this review is conducted?   




(3) Are performance targets known to both you and to the Board?  
(4) What does it spell out that you’re accountable, as the Executive Director, to 
produce? 
(5) What are the consequences if the Executive Director meets their contractual 
obligations? 
(6) Are there bonuses for meeting certain goals? 
(7) Are the penalties for not meeting others? 
(8) Are the criteria clear? 
Survey Instrument 1 Board Member Interview 
[Interviewer: “This is the Introduction:  Many of the questions I’m about to ask 
are open ended.  Please elaborate where possible.  The goal is to explore 
organizational checks and safeguards: such as contracts, monitoring, and 
performance review.  This will be compared with other agencies that, like your 
agency, scored above-expectations in degree centrality on the Social Network 
Analysis Census conducted by the Lincy Institute 2-years ago. 
Some questions are broad and you may answer them as broadly as you wish.  
Alternatively, some questions are specific and you may answer them as 
specifically as you wish.  You may decline to answer any questions you don’t feel 
comfortable answering.  You may end the survey anytime.  We expect it will less 




sign these forms (present informed consent documentation and authorization to be 
recorded). 
Board Member 
2) Checks and Safeguards: 
a) Contracts 
i) Standard questions  
(1) What contracts exist within this organization? 
(2) How were they created? 
(3) Who on the board is responsible for overseeing them? 
(4) How are individuals held accountable in these contracts? 
(5) Would you make them available for this study? 
ii) Possible follow-up questions: 
(1) Does your organization have written job responsibilities for both the Executive 
Director and Board Members? 
(2) Did you sign a written contract? 
(a) In your own words, being as specific as possible, what does it detail? 
(3) Do you have a vote on the board? 
(4) Does your organization have a written conflict of interest policy? 





i) Standard Questions: 
(1) How is your performance, as a board member, monitored? Please elaborate. 
(2) How is the performance of your executive director monitored? 
ii) Possible follow up questions: 
(1) In what ways are those (restate responses) monitored? 
(2) What do you hold yourself accountable to produce, that no one checks on? 
(3) Who determined what measures you’re held accountable for producing? 
iii) Is the performance of your Executive Director monitored?  How so?  Please 
elaborate. 
(1) What is monitored? 
(2) In what ways are those (restate responses) monitored? 
(3) Who determined what measures the Executive Director would be held 
accountable for producing? 
c) Performance Review 
i) Standard Questions: 
(1) How is the performance of the board reviewed at your organization? 
(2) How is the performance of the executive director reviewed at your organizations? 




(1) Is there a written policy for how this review is conducted?   
(2) How often are you reviewed?   
(3) Are performance targets known to both you and to the Board members?  
(4) What does it spell out that you’re accountable, as a Board Member, to produce? 
(5) What are the consequences if a Board Member fails to meet their contractual 
obligations? 
(6) Are there bonuses for meeting certain goals? 
(7) Are the penalties for not meeting others? 


















 The following cases are arranged in order (from highest-to-lowest) by their calculated 
Formal Features Index (FFI).  The FFI was developed especially for this research.  The score 
indicates the presence and ordinal level of formalization of contracts, monitoring, performance 
review, and bonuses.  The higher the FFI, the more formalized the checks and safeguard features 
within the agency.  The FFI is calculated utilizing the following rubric:   
 
Table 5 Formal Features Index Rubric 
Area of Interest Highest form of ED Oversight FFI scoring value 
Contracts Signed Contract 4 
Unsigned Contract 3 
Signed Offer Letter 2 
Job Description 1 
No contract, letter, or description 0 






Formal, regular 4 











Bonus (non-contingent) 2 
No Bonus 0 
       
The FFI total was calculated separately for each agency.  The highest score possible in 





Case study 1: “Casino Royale” (FFI Score 16) 
This organization is a very-large social service sector nonprofit serving across multiple 
jurisdictions.  Serving more than 100,000 clients each year, this organization is a fixture in the 
community in which it serves.  It has been active for many decades and serves as an excellent 
case to begin to analyze the practices and perspectives active between executive directors and 
their boards of directors regarding contracts, monitoring, and performance review. 
 
Contracts         
Whereas some organizations had been operating without changes in their management 
structure for multiple years and across the tenure of multiple executive directors, this 
organization has recently restructured its management.  Only days after the passing of the 
previous executive director, the current executive director received a phone call from the board 
chair saying, “We have no succession plan in place at the agency and we are not sure what we’re 
going to do to go forward.  Can you come and talk to us about helping us think through a 
succession plan?” 
 In the end, although with short lead time, a very successful succession plan was 
developed and implemented.  This would be the beginning of a much longer relationship as the 
full time executive director.  Speaking to his unique qualifications to be selected for the job, 
Executive Director A stated, “You know, I’ve run large organizations all over the country, gone 
into existing organizations, started new ones, hotel/casino resorts. So, I said I’ve done this, I’ve 
never done it for a non-profit, but I’ve run large agencies.”  
 A contract was developed in concert between the executive director and the board of 




and an incentive focused bonus structure, much as one would find in an gaming for-profit 
corporation.  The dynamic was reportedly working very well for all involved. 
 
Monitoring 
 Monitoring at the agency occurs through various means.  Due to the large size of the 
organization, a simple model worked best to describe the methods and areas of monitoring such a 
large and complex organization Executive Director A stated, “It is a pretty big business, so we 
set up the measurement stuff in five general areas, so we have operations, finance, 
development/fundraising, community relations, and then human resources.” 
 Elaborating on these five-principle areas, “These five areas serve as focal point for all 
subsequent monitoring.  The board meets every other month to discuss these areas and to review 
the needs and progress of the organization.”  Both the executive director and board are involved 
in the monitoring. “At the end of the year, I will do a soft appraisal and produce documentation 
and information to substantiate the results.”  Building upon the idea of formalized structure and 
process they relayed, “that information is then given to the board of the executive committee 
then they review it and issue a recommendation to the full board and the executive session to ask 
what my employment review is. They present it to me typically called a Letter of 
Commendation.”   
The combination of private sector experience and board oversight is important for the 
healthy operation of this organization.  “So, it takes the form of very much I brought to the 
agency with my private sector background because I wanted to make sure that it was very clear.”  




is declared to be the primary motivation for having such delineated contractual responsibilities.  
Executive Director A continued: 
 
I used that same document, those same goals to create the same goals for all of my 
agency.   Direct reports so that there is good pyramidal alignment between what I am 
doing and my focus points are… so all of the directors and department heads here know 
what my goals are because they become a part of their goals.  
        (Executive Director A)   
 
The entire operation works to secure the accomplishment of the goals of the executive 
director and board.  The respondent doesn’t have an official vote on the board, but all board 
members do sign and complete conflict of interest forms.  When asked what they hold 
themselves accountable to produce that no one checks on, Executive Director A responded, “So I 
have the mission statement for [redacted] on my desk. I keep it in the middle of my desk.  I work 
hard to ensure that everything I am doing is supporting that mission statement.” 
 Speaking to trust, “So, most of the things that I do on a daily basis are not monitored by 
the Board of Trustees. Frankly in our relationship, which is wonderful for me, is basically I 
inform them of what I think they need to be aware of.”  This selective passing-of-information is 
an emergent theme identified in the research. Not all information can be passed to the board, 
there simply isn’t sufficient throughput or time.   
Executive Director A continued, “Basically, I’m accountable and responsible for the 
healthy and productive operations of the agency. So, there are a lot of things that I do that the 




emerges as another theme.  Moreover, “What I do is I inform them of what I think is important 
for them to know. It is in a way that doesn’t become over burdening.” 
 Monitoring also occurs through regular every-other-month meetings of the board with the 
executive director.  Reports covering the five areas are reviewed and questions/concerns are 
raised when present.  Bi-monthly meeting monitoring occurs with the full board present, but as 
Executive Director A relates, “I talk to the executive committee more frequently and I talk to my 
board president more frequently but with respect to the full board, we use the board meeting as 
really the mechanism to share results and sort outcomes.” 
Management meetings occur at the agency each quarter.  These meetings include “all the 
managers, directors, and VP’s.  We meet and each meeting each department presents a very crisp 
perspective of their last quarter’s goal and their current goal and how they achieved-what they 
did.”  The executive director invites all board members to attend.  But, “it is voluntary, but we do 
ask that every board member try to attend at least one every year because that is a really good 
way for them to learn about the agency.”  The executive director clearly wants the board to be as 
involved as possible in understanding the work and needs of the organization. 
Board Member A responded that monitoring, aside from the bi-monthly board meetings, 
also occurred by paying attention to “the profile that we see coming through the community.”  In 
addition, they stated: 
I see him very actively involved in communications and television interviews and 
monthly newsletters that we see and all the opportunities that we see him involved and 
actively participating in.  He is very involved and actively engaged and to that extent I 
guess that’s the monitoring we do.  





Both Executive Director A and Board Member A were careful to highlight the 
collaborative nature of their management and oversight.  There were clear moment of trust and 
admiration expressed when discussing monitoring.   What could otherwise be seen as 
burdensome and tiring was instead communicated as a means of sharing successes with each 
other, the community, and their staff. 
 
Performance Review 
 An official review of the executive director occurs via formal policy and procedure each 
year.  Regarding bonuses linked to performance, “In my employment agreement, there is a 
maximum goal which is a percentage of my salary that the board can award me based on my 
achievement of those goals.”  The executive director was quick to highlight the discretionary 
nature of these bonuses, “They have the discretion to make a recommendation to those and 
award me that bonus if I chose to accept it.  I have declined several bonuses with gratitude only 
because I felt that I wanted to give the money back to the agency.” 
In keeping with this sentiment of universal mission focus, Board Member A spoke to 
what would happen if the executive director didn’t live up to expectations at a performance 
review: “I don’t think we’ve even thought about it to be honest with you because he is doing 
such a great job and we are so appreciative of his talents and what he does.”  Additionally, the 
executive director highlighted at length the importance of trust and its role in contracts, 





So, I think it is a very healthy relationship, a critical one certainly for me, to have a Board 
I can depend on and that the board depends on me. They trust me and I think that that is 
critical and I am grateful that I have that with the board. I think every board member, if 
you reached out to them, would say that they trust me, they believe in me, they believe in 
the mission and I feel the same way about them.  That is a bit esoteric but it is very 
important to me, that level of relationship because everything else to me as far as the 
results and the communications and the assignments all come along with that.” 
                 (Executive Director A) 
Summary 
 This executive director brought vast private-sector experience into their current role.  Not 
only were bonus structure applied to all C-suite directors, but all goals were made to align with 
the organization’s strategic plan.  Although this organization scores among the highest of the 
ASI index, it is not missed that the executive director places an immense amount of trust in the 
board while acknowledging that they also apply immense amounts of trust in the executive 
director as well. 
 
 
Case Study 2 “Never Again” (FFI Score 16) 
Never Again recently hired a new executive director.  This hire follows a very long 
tenure held by the previous executive director.  This situation afforded an interesting perspective 
into the organization during a period of intentional transition and change.  Although considerably 
smaller than the [Casino Royale] (approximately 1/10 the annual revenue), this organization still 




organization experienced considerable upheaval with each board member working as no less 
than 10-hours per week/each to manage the stressful transition.  This stress led to the imposition 
of very rigid Agency-theory like structures. 
  
Contracts 
The accountability structure for the executive director in this organization was incredibly 
intensive.  Following the departure of the previous executive director, the board was clear that 
some of the problems that befell the organization were going to be addressed administratively 
through tight controls, oversight, and proper incentivization.   
 Regarding the newness of the hire and the new contract, they reported that it was 
completed by a board committee with the involvement of the incoming executive director “just a 
few weeks ago- a vigorous discussion!”  Regarding the previous executive director’s contract, “it 
was fluid.  It was constantly changing.  There were different variations of it.  I know there was a 
2003, 2007, 2009, and 2011 variation.”   
The constant reformatting of expectations through reformatting of the contract was 
communicated as a problem that shouldn’t have been allowed to happen.  While this was done in 
concert with the board, it was described by both Board Member B and Executive Director B, as 
having a been a failure of management.  Board Member B communicated that this time, the goals 
would not change to meet the performance of the executive director, but that it would be the 
other way around.  This time, the executive director would perform up to the goals, or they 
would be dismissed.   
 Prominently featured in the new executive director’s contract is a 6-month and 12-month 




another 6-months to meet them or employment will be severed.  Executive Director B was not 
hesitant to articulate the finality of the goals set for them, “If I am not reaching them we will 
have six months to find out why.  If I am not performing, I will be replaced.”   
 Regarding the contract, numerous facets were described.   In fact, the executive director 
was very clear on the content of the contract.  Regarding the content he stated, “Fundraising 
goals- fundraising goals! That is the big one.  It is really detailed on that.”  Other aspects were 
clear as well: 
I can’t get into trouble.  They don’t want me getting...like if I get arrested, I get fired. I 
can’t get into any kind of trouble.  I can’t make the organization look bad.  There’s 
specific points in there about that, public image.”  Of course, they continued – “all the 
basic stuff on embezzling money and proper use of funds.  I can’t pay my contractor, I 
can’t pay our work contractors to work on my home. It covers salary, possible bonuses, 
raises, my responsibilities as far as the flow organizational chart with me over the project 
manager, the program manager, and the operations manager and anyone else we hire 
under them. 
        (Executive Director B) 
      
There was no ambiguity regarding severability in the contract with the executive director, 
“I am employed at the discretion of the board instead of the other people that work here which 
are employed at my discretion.”  Executive Director B was hired despite having never been an 
executive director before.  The board, aware of this, built safeguards into the human resource 




have executive director experience. I have run the company for 6 months we are doing great 
everything is going in the right direction. Yet there is still a ton I don’t know.” 
Expectations were not much different on the board-side.  Board Member B reported that 
there was a contact for the executive director and a written-board expectation document that was 
signed by the board members annually.  In fact, each board member re-signs their board 
expectation document each year.  The expectations delineate responsibilities.  The organization 
is small.  As they related, “there are only a handful of employees there, so the board is bigger 
than the employees.”  Regarding the contract with the executive director, Board Member B 
stated, “the contract delineates salary, bonuses, performance structures, work expectations, 
philanthropy…once we get drafts with the ED, and once we agree to that…we will execute that 
contract with them.”  The reason for the care and concern is clear with this agency.  As the 
Executive Director reported: 
This is after years of very fluid contracts that honestly weren’t followed.  There was not 
checks and balances.  There was no oversight.  They got into a position to where the 
entire board was working 10-hours a week, all of them, on top of their full-time jobs just 
trying to keep us afloat. They don’t ever want us to be in that position again, so they 
created these strict guidelines. 




 Regarding monitoring, Executive Director B reiterated the 6-month/12-month review 




quarterly board meetings, “State of the Union type thing.  State of the Organization.”  When 
asked who gets to decide what gets reported, “we have a basic agenda and then I add to it.  It is 
something we all put together.  We talk about the same stuff every quarter.”   
 When asked what they hold themselves accountable to produce that no one checks on 
they stated, “My employee’s personal growth, increase in the number of clients, getting out our 
name out in creative and expanding ways, and continuing in my education on my own time and 
my own dollar for that matter.” 
 Board Member B related, “Broken down, monitoring the board is “showing up, doing the 
work, making sure that I am prepared for all the meetings, making sure that I understand the 
financials that I can help present or back…new initiatives, projects, expenditures along the way.”  




 Given the opportune timing of the interview in such a recently formalized review 
structure, additional questions were asked.  There was not a written policy yet for how the review 
was to be conducted, but it was being prepared.  Performance targets were being developed with 
the intention that they would be clear and known to both the board and the Executive Director B.   
I don’t think those matrices are in there to get rid of anybody.  They are in there to make 
sure we are going in the right direction.  If we’re not, they are going to come in and say, 
“How can we help?  Is it you?  Or are we doing something wrong?”  We will figure it out 
and move forward together.  That’s the whole point 




 Given the newness of the position, performance review was a work in progress.  Reviews 
had been planned at 30 days/60 days/90 days as well as six months and twelve months.  The 
board was clear that it did not want a problem to develop unnoticed.  Regarding its own 
performance, the executive committee of the board meets annually.  “We go board member-by-
board member and go- Is [redacted] pulling his weight?  It is very informal.”  Because of the 
newness of the recent changes, the exact policy for reviewing the performance of the executive 
director has not been finalized. 
 Consequences if a board member fails to meet their contractual obligations during a 
review include discussions, replacement, or dismissal.  Board Member B stated, “The ED just 
did this and he called the board member and said, “Look, you have a contractual obligation to 
donate a minimum of X amount of dollars and you haven’t done that for two years.  Can you 
provide us with a reason or what you are going to do to remedy that?”   
 In cases where a board member is unable to perform a choice is offered, “We need a 
board member that is active.  You can’t!…can you appoint somebody else or somebody else 
from your organization who will show up? We have done that.”  
 
Summary 
This organization was interviewed during a time of bitter transition.  The previous executive 
director, despite being under-contract, left the organization in a bind (and in debt).  The incoming 
executive director was tasked to resolve the bind and pay down the debt.  While this organization 
was working to create the most formalized system of checks and safeguards it has ever deployed, 




There seemed to be an understanding that the checks and safeguards being put in place were 
for the good of all.  This echoed Casino Royale where there was an expressed understanding that 
the contract was designed to create clarity and promote the accomplishment of goals, not to 
restrict or bind the decision-making authority of the CEO.  There was clear alignment of 
incentives and the contractual obligation between the organization, the executive director, and 
the board. 
 
Case Study 3 “Bespoke” (FFI score 14) 
 Much like the previous organization, this organization recently underwent major 
revisions in management.  Unlike the previous executive director, however, this organization’s 
executive director left well-regarded by the board.  In fact, the incoming executive director 
(Executive Director C) was groomed for the position.  That said, a skeptical board made sure to 
build in regular reviews during the first year to ensure performance.  They were clear that the 
first year was entirely probationary for this new, never before CEO, executive director.  
Contracts 
The executive director at this organization does not have a contract.  When asked about 
job descriptions, they responded “I believe we have one.  I have not seen it because I believe I 
am supposed to come up with one for me.”  Continuing, “It is just a practice that we are going 
through internally…[Bespoke] has never had contracts with their Eds.” 
By the time Board Member C was interviewed, the details of the contract had been 
determined and the contract signed.  It appears that the contracting processes mentioned by 






I was not part of the Board, you know, at that time. So, I am not familiar with exactly 
how she managed to come into her contract. I was only involved at the end, you know, as 
we were going through our succession plan of actually bringing in a new ED.   
        (Executive Director C) 
Because of the overlapping leadership in place at this organization, the outgoing executive 
director helped craft the new contract.  
 
Monitoring  
Executive Director C is directly monitored by the Executive Committee.  The committee 
meets 10-times per year.  Executive Director C, speaking to the work of the committee- “that’s 
where they hear about the workings of the agency and what we are about.  That group is actually 
the one who performs the CEO’s performance evaluation on their anniversary.”    
Interestingly, The executive director is both President of the Board and CEO.  When 
asked about activities at the executive committee they responded that the actual board is fairly 
small with a large board of trustees who serve primarily as advocates and financial supporters. 
  
Performance Review 
Regarding performance evaluation, the respondent reported that it was done annually.  In 
fact, the annual review was approaching shortly after the time of the interview.  The respondent 
reported that criteria for the review were not clear.  Clarifying the criteria on which they 




 There was no reported policy for how the reviews are to be conducted.  Targets, while 
reportedly broad and non-specific, were also reported to be generally known to both the 
executive director and the board.  As Executive Director C stated, “Yes. I would say that those 
are formulated throughout the year.  You know as far as things to look out for.”   
 Bonuses have been awarded in the past, but generally not in connection to the 
performance of any particular job responsibility.  In fact, they reported “It is pretty much an end 
of the year Christmas-type bonus situation.  That is how usually it has been in the past.  We 
haven’t seen bonuses in a while.” 
 Regarding another organization, “I do sit on some board where we keep what we call 
scoresheets, so within that scoresheet…we look at your fundraising piece…how many meetings 
you missed, and you know, how many you attended, and how many committees you sat on, and 
the whole works.”  Exploring this further they related: 
I feel like in some organizations it is needed. Sometimes, some boards of directors need 
to be held accountable. Then there are some individuals that sat on boards, they are 
totally committed, and you do not have to hold them accountable and in other cases there 
are.   Having a scoresheet that, where you can actually document the performance of a 
board member, works in many cases. 
 
Summary 
This is an interesting and large organization with a few noteworthy features.  The board 
meets with the full management team monthly.  The executive director is both the President of 




organization’s transition was done intentionally and with coordination between the outgoing 
executive director, the incoming executive director, and the board. 
 
Case Study 4 “Strategic Focus” (FFI Score 13) 
 This organization, certainly in terms of footprint and reach, is the largest of those 
interviewed.  Serving hundreds of thousands each year, this organization is well-known in its 
community and its field.   
 
Contracts 
Executive Director D, at this organization, is not under contract.  Speaking to this they 
stated, “I do not have an employment contract with the board, and I never have where ever I have 
been, so it is an at-will sort of relationship. But, we do you know when someone leaves the 
organization sometimes there is a separation agreement contract.”  During board onboarding, 
conflict of interest statements are signed as well as a confidentiality agreement. 
 The executive director spoke about the positive influence of a larger national 
credentialing organization had in their operations.  “We are separate 501c3, but we are affiliated 
with [redacted] because they have all the best practices and the contacts we need to access 
[redacted] manufacturers and leadership development.   
Interestingly, Board Member D was quite clear that contracts were at play for all 
employees – including the executive director.  This is a mismatch from the executive director’s 
response.  The board member unambiguously stated, “You know, and of course, some of the 
standard contracts like we talked about.  There are contracts between the ED, and all of the 





 Monitoring at this organization occurs through the careful presentation of performance 
metrics, selected by Executive Director D, to the board. 
 
I have annual goals that I set that are approved by them. Then, I also have in that a couple 
of stretch goals that, if I meet those, then I would be eligible for a bonus at the pleasure of 
the board, that is not guaranteed. So those goals are tied to the strategic plan which we 
update every 3-4 years. We update it more often than that, but we completely create a 
new one every 3-4 years. 
        (Executive Director D) 
 
 Executive Director D continued, “One of my goals this year is to make sure that Strategic 
Plan that we just adopted July 1 is alive and understood by all of the employees and that our 
partners and stakeholders in the community are on board with it.”  As far as alignment of goals 
throughout the organization, the goals of all C-suite employees are simultaneously aligned to the 
strategic plan as well. 
 When asked what the executive director holds themselves accountable to produce that no 
one checks on Executive Director D remarked: 
 
That’s a great question -  Self-care.  I know that I have to be the best I can be in terms of 
mental, physical health, spiritual health.  There’s no one following me around with a 
magnifying glass examining any of that.  I do know that my role. The philosophy I have 




important to always develop the team around me and to be looking for the up and coming 
leaders in the organization and to figure out which of those folks I, or my executive team, 
can mentor, and coach, and groom to get them ready to step into a larger role.  That’s 
been a big emphasis of ours in the last couple of years.  It’s not really written down 
anywhere, but it’s already paid off dividends.  
         (Executive Director D) 
 
 Executive Director D stated that this particular board has really enabled him to focus on 
some of the highest levels of management and delivery: 
 
They really freed me up to spend 70-80% of my time outside these [walls].  That’s again, 
when I’m outside the organization, I’m meeting with board members, donors, potential 
donors, partners. People that can do things for us- elected officials.  I spent the day in 
Carson City last Thursday.  That’s the best use of my time because, whenever I do that, 
good things come back here. 
 
With regards to accountability in leadership, a noteworthy quote was given, “I’ve found 
the staff will take as much of me as I allow them to have.  So, I have found I have limited 
appropriate access to the team.”  Executive Director D was careful to note the importance of 
balancing higher-level executive functions with providing guidance and confidence to the team 





They check on most things up there to be honest.  They make sure I am doing the work 
and they do monitor and follow me. You know once in a while if there is personnel things 
that I have to get involved in, which is very rare, because that is not a board member’s 
role but sometimes I will get in those and I’m not really checked on those. But, that is 
pretty rare. 
        (Executive Director D) 
 
Performance Review 
 Performance review at this organization occurs in several formalized ways.  There are 
several mechanisms of performance review at play in this organization: 
 
It is usually handled after the fiscal year is closed.  It is the executive committee (the 
officers plus two-other board members).  They do a self-evaluation and go over that with 
the board chair.  Then the board chair gives me feedback and shares that with the 
executive committee.  At the next board meeting in closed session, they discuss it and the 
board chair comes back to me with some sort of feedback or things that I can improve on 
or praise about what I’m doing well.  Then, they sign off the compensation.   
 
 Interestingly, Executive Director D spoke to potential controversies with respect to salary 
and bonuses.  They explained: 
 
Whenever I get a question about compensation, which in this town there’s interest in that.  




I get a question about my salary, maybe a reporter every three years, I’ll just say oh let 
me refer you to [Board Member D] because I don’t have any say so in that.  Because it’s 
true.  Obviously, it’s not a number they just pull out of the air. They look at other 
comparable nonprofits in the region and they come up with a fair number.” 
         (Executive Director D) 
  
 
Regarding board and its own performance review Board Member D stated:   
 
There is an attendance policy. It is a part of the contract you sign and we do enforce that.  
If you don’t show up to at least 50% of the meetings, we will typically ask you to replace 
yourself with someone from your organization who can show up or we question whether 
or not the organization needs to be there.”  
 
Summary 
This is an organization with both Agency Theory-like behaviors with regards to certain 
operational aspects and Stewardship Theory-like behaviors with other operational aspects.   
Executive Director D has neither a contract nor an exact idea of how much they will make year 
to year.  Board Member D believed there was an enforceable contract in place between them.  
This board was careful to not only monitor the performance of the executive director regularly, 






Case Study 5 “Green Giant” (FFI Score 12) 
This organization (second largest in terms of annual revenue) has been a long-standing 
fixture in the service-space in which it served.  The responses from the Executive Director E and 
from Board Member E were interesting and insightful when placed into the larger context of the 
research matters at hand. 
 
Contracts 
 There was divergence in the responses of the executive director and the board director 
with regards to the executive director’s contract.  In this case, the divergence began from the 
very outset with the relaying of whether the executive director had a contract or not.  According 
to Executive Director E, they did not have a contract per-se; rather, they had a job description 
which was incorporated as an offer letter and signed at the time of hiring.  The executive director 
acknowledged that all other employees in the organization had an official contract, but that this 
was not the case for them.  As they recounted, “I do not have an employment contract, but I am 
very familiar with employment contracts that have non-compete disclosures and things like that 
and I do not have an employment contract.”  Interestingly, they recounted: 
I really want to be open and honest about this process.  I don’t generally follow some of 
the same guidelines that I have imposed for the departments.  If you can see, I am kind of 
reflecting back to “have I ever signed it?  I would love to at this point. 
        (Executive Director E) 
 
 One must immediately wonder how an Executive Director with an extensive background 




contract until they were asked by the interviewer.  In fact, the executive director asked their 
administrative assistant to pull their file to check to see if there was a signed contract.  There was 
not. 
 Executive Director E had been involved in the search committee and had helped to craft 
the very same document by which they were now operating.  “I created it.  This particular 
position is a little unique in that I was actually doing the recruitment for the ED.  My background 
is in Human Resources.” 
 In this particular case, the employment offer letter was not viewed as a contract.  It may 
seem like splitting hairs, but in the context of this study, the word contract seemed to mean what 




 The Executive Director is reviewed at this organization primarily by the board chair who 
presides over governance.  Additionally, there is a compensation committee which every board 
member sits upon.  There is also a special conflict committee which handles disputes arising 
from shared space with another nonprofit organization.  Interestingly, the executive director 
reported the name of this organization as the “Special Projects Committee”, while the board 
director reported it as the “Special Conflict Committee”.  The Board reviews Executive Director 
E’s performance once-a-year in an annual evaluation.  
When asked what they hold themselves accountable to produce that no one checks on, 




having conversations.  I mean, I am always looking for fundraising opportunities or opportunities 
to position the organization to receive additional support.” 
 
Performance Review   
Speaking to the relatively infrequent evaluations: 
 
I personally don’t agree with once a year reviews.  I think that reviews, truly reviews if 
they are going to be effective, are more-or-less ongoing.  I think that there is so much 
more work that individuals can do in terms of evaluations for executives…the truth of the 
matter is even when they say it happens, it does not really happen. 
          (Executive Director E) 
 
 The board meets quarterly, but reports are generated by the executive director and 
submitted to the board monthly.  Subcommittees meet quarterly as well unless there is a pressing 
issue.  Interestingly, the 360 evaluations are done at Executive Director E’s direction and include 
immediate staff, line-level staff, and community partners.  They stated, “I mean, you think 
you’re doing a phenomenal job but how do others perceive you out in the community? So, I go 
out in the community because that is what is most important and provide that information back to 
them.”   
 Being a seasoned executive director, regarding bonuses, they reported: 
 
In different circumstances, I have been offered bonuses or things just based off meeting 




nonprofit and what we do here we can better use it in different ways.  But, I have been 
offered bonuses as a result of new initiatives and different performance matrices. 
        (Executive Director E) 
 
Humorously, regarding the clarity of criteria for triggering bonuses, Executive Director E 
stated that they were, “Clear as mud, absolutely.”  Additionally, they stated that they are 
reviewed at least annually “initially by the compensation committee and then the compensation 
committee provides a recommendation, well, provides a report of the performance review and 
any recommendations to the full board.” 
Stylistically, the board performance review was described by Board Member E as “peer-
to-peer.” Whereas, the executive director “is asked to provide kind of a self-assessment.  Their 
accomplishments based on the budget, fundraising goals, programmatic oversight, you know, 
anything we have asked them to focus on as a priority, they provide a self-assessment”.  
Elaborating on the process: 
The Compensation Committee of the Board reviews that self-assessment. We then 
deliberate among ourselves in closed session and then provide whatever feedback to the 
executive director and then, if there is a recommendation for salary adjustment or any 
other personnel or performance related kind of recommendation, then again that gets 
reported back to the full board that ratifies the subcommittee’s decision or 
recommendation. 




 With regards to bonuses, Executive Director E elaborated that there were bonus 
structures within the organization.  However, there was no expectation that bonuses would be 
paid.  They stated: 
 
The amount may depend on what is available in discretionary dollars at the time…it is 
not like, “If you do this thing you will automatically get this.”  It is, “these are our 
expectations of you and then at the end of the year, when we are reviewing you, we will 
either adjust your salary or adjust your salary and provide you with a onetime bonus for 
performance.” 
        (Executive Director E) 
 
Summary 
There is an old English phrase, “the cobbler’s children often go unshod.”  In this case, a 
human resources professional failed to notice they weren’t contracted until asked by the 
researcher.  Moreover, they openly acknowledged that the executive director position was treated 
differently than all other positions in the organization.   
 Despite that lack of clarity regarding a contract, the board did provide regular and careful 
oversight of the executive director’s performance.  There are hallmarks of formalization and this 
organization was a hodge-podge of them.  Some were in place, others were not.  Both Agency 







Case Study 6 “The Founder’s Garden” (FFI Score 8) 
This organization proved to be one of the most responsive and was among the first 
interviewed.   The founder was/is still the executive director.  The board of directors had cycled 
through replacement members many times since.  From the outset and by design, all board 
members were term-limited.  This churn, according to Executive Director F brought “fresh blood 
and new ideas.”  Perhaps so, this also creates only one fixed star in the sky of the organization, 
the founder- Executive Director F. 
 
Contracts 
 The executive director of this organization does not have a contract.  As they recounted, 
“My other CEO friends, that have nonprofits – they have contracts or agreements.  Where I 
didn’t, I wrote everything the way it should be.  I picked the board members.”   
 Elaborating on the cycling and turnover of board members, they recounted “Some keep 
board members forever.  Maybe that’s good.  I don’t know.  I don’t think it is.”  Term limits had 
been built into the organization since its founding. 
 While there were no contracts, there are acknowledged responsibilities for both board 
members and for executive directors.  Nevertheless, the stated reasoning for the boards is 
interesting. “As far as what I do as the CEO and what the board’s responsible for, because there 
is always that fine line…does the board come in and start dictating what goes on during the day 
or are they just an advisory board?”  The stated reason for the written responsibilities of both is 
to prevent micromanagement of the day-to-day operations of the organization, as defined by the 
CEO.  When asked who wrote the responsibilities, the founder stated, “I wrote them both and 




Whereas the founder and executive director stated that they did not have a contract, 
Board Member F responded that they did.  When asked about how it was created they responded, 
“I don’t know if I know that answer to that question.  I think it was definitely something that the 
board put together as far as job duties. I would imagine that was before my time on the board.” 
 Compiling the responses from the executive director along with the board, it is possible 
that the job description that the executive director reported was viewed as a contract to the board 
member.  The chair was said to oversee reviewing the contract and mentioned that there were 
annual performance reviews.  Specifically, there was a great deal of attention given to his 
financial component of his annual review.   
 Board members were believed to have job descriptions in their board handbook, but the 
respondent was unable to recall if it was signed or not.  In fact, when asked whether it was a 
signed document, Board Member F stated, “Man, I should know…I want to say yes but I don’t 
know for sure.  I sign a lot of stuff.”  When subsequently asked what it detailed, he stated, “I 
would imagine it details term length, the responsibilities I am doing on the board, as well if I am 
the Treasurer or Chairman.” 
 
Monitoring 
 The performance of the executive director is monitored through monthly meetings with 
the entire board.  The organization’s “Think Tank” is comprised of 6 Vice-Presidents from each 
division who meet and compile a monthly report regarding their respective accomplishments 
relating the overall strategic plan.  These contributions are later assembled into a report which 





The Think Tank is part of our strategic plan that goes into our final document that is then 
presented to the board.  Our board then looks at our strategic plan and then says- “do 
that.”  They never say, “that’s stupid we’re never going to do that.”  As long there isn’t 
mission creep, which is always a challenge internally for us, then we’re okay. 
        (Executive Director F) 
 
Building on the central nature of the strategic plan, “our strategic plan is a condensed 
version of what went to the board.  Our strategic plan is one with a bunch of listings, how to get 
where we need to be for each of the objectives.”   The executive director was said to be 
monitored most prominently in his annual review.  When Board Member F was asked what they 
hold themselves accountable for that no one checks on, the respondent stated “I mean, I just try 
to add value where I can.  So, if there’s something in my wheelhouse, I am going to try and take 
control of it.”  When asked what the board holds individual members accountable for producing, 
they said, “well, just making sure you show up to meetings.  I think that is probably one of the 
more important things to being on the board is actually being present.”   
 
Performance Review 
The performance of the executive director is reviewed annually.  The respondent stated, 
“I put together the initial form for the annual evaluation for the CEO.  There was not evaluation 
for many years when I started it.”  He continued, “I went to the board and said, “we need to 
develop a true evaluation form for me, I mean, I think I’m doing fine.  I’m doing okay, but we 




 The respondent borrowed from an industry professionalization organization that ended up 
being too lengthy and complicated for both the board and the executive director.  Eventually, it 
was reviewed by the board and shorted into the annual evaluation that exists today.   
 Performance targets contained in the annual review are known both to the board and to 
the executive director.  When questioned about whether the goals in the executive director 
performance review are made to align with the goals of the VPs in their reviews, the respondent 
stated “No.  I don’t because their program goals are very specific to the particular area.”   
 Regarding performance review, Board Member F related that it was borrowed from best 
practices.  ‘I would imagine that [Executive Director F] is bringing to us…what the best 




This organization served as an interesting comparison point.  Several mismatches were 
present in the responses.  While there was no contract in place, yet there is regular, self-directed, 
and self-selecting reporting structures. 
Perhaps the greatest point of interest in this organization was the apparent un-fire-ability of 
the executive director.  When asked “what are the consequences if you don’t meet your described 
obligations? They responded: 
What does the board do to me?  I’ll tell you what they can’t do!  Because I’m the founder, 
they can’t get rid of the founder.  Isn’t that an interesting thought?  Through the law, you 
can’t get rid of the founder.   





Investigating this further, the only literature discovered related to a nonprofit board’s 
inability to fire a founder was relatively obscure single member membership organizations or 
single-member bylaws being incorporated into the organization at the time of founding.  Given 
the role of the researcher in this space, and lacking the legal expertise to speak to it more 
authoritatively, the interesting assertion was left to rest. 
 
Case study 7 “Little Giant” (FFI Score 8) 
Occasionally, older organizations languish in a stage of perpetual startup-hood.  This 
organization, although in existence for more than 20-years, only recently secured funding for a 
full-time Executive Director.  The organization served as a macro-level organization, bringing 




 The Executive Director of this organization is not on contract.  In fact, there are no 
developed policies or procedures around contracts at all in this organization.  There are however, 
job responsibilities.  For the Executive Director, they cover: 
Oversight of the organization’s financial security, our programming, supervision of staff, 
initiation of any contract, budget compliance, grant writing, grant management, 
establishing collaborative partnerships, maintaining partnerships, and then there are some 
specificities from some of our specific programing. 




The document, which contained such clear description of the responsibilities, was made 
fast when it became memorialized as an offer letter to the executive director.  From the board’s 
perspective, Board Member G stated, “We don’t have contracts we have agreements.  But she’s 
what our expectation is…neither…have never let us down since I’ve been on the board.” 
Board Member G was quick to highlight that they had “agreements, not contracts.”  
When pressed for differentiation between a contract and an agreement they stated, “A contract to 
me is legally binding.  An agreement is a gentleman’s agreement if you would use an old fashion 
term.”  When asked about whether this implied legal recourse, they said, “right!” 
 
Monitoring 
 The executive director is monitored monthly at the general board meetings, but also 
specifically quarterly when quarterly financials are reviewed.  Furthermore, because the ED’s 
position is funded via different billable grants, a timesheet is maintained. 
 When asked what they hold themselves accountable to produce that no one checks on, 
they replied:  
 
Each hour of my day, each meeting we have with partners in the community, you’re 
already familiar with how we leverage partnerships because [redacted] was involved in 
that research anyway.  So anything that [Little Giant] does is in collaboration with other 
organizations.  
 
There really isn’t any activity that we carry out programming wise in the community that 




meetings with partners and providing resources to agencies and agencies also providing 
resources to me. And so, I guess beyond my timesheet and then eventual large outcomes, 
I mean my Board doesn’t know every single meeting I have with every single partner and 
what the specific objectives of those meetings are. 
        (Executive Director G) 
 
Performance Review 
Given the general informality of the organization, an interesting situation arose in which 
the executive director wished to discuss a pay increase with the board.  Executive Director G 
elaborated: 
So, I felt at one year that it was a good time to discuss my performance with the board.   
So, I created the agenda for our board meetings and I put it on the agenda and I had 
highlights of my performance that I shared and there was some brief, you know 
discussion, like affirmation.   
 
All of people were like, “Yes! You’ve been outstanding.”  It was affirming.  Then they 
said, “well, we would like to” ...I made a specific ask for the pay increase that I wanted to 
have. Then they said, “ Well we’ll have a discussion outside of this board meeting and 
we’ll get back to you. 
        (Executive Director G)  
 
The executive director felt confident that a performance review and raise discussion 




preferred.  In subsequent discussion, Executive Director G related that they found the slowness 
of the decision on the raise to be unexpected.  This highlights that many different factors are in 
play when looking at an organization and whether it approaches situations from an Agency 
Theory or Stewardship Theory perspective. 
 
Summary 
Many ideas, related to this research, were brought into contrast and relief at this 
organization.  When asked very specifically by the interviewer, “I am curious.  I am going to 
explore an idea here.  Your background is in HR and your ED isn’t under contract, how do you 
make sense of that?”  Board Member G replied, “That is a good question.  Now you’re making 
me think.”  Continuing, they related: 
 
You know we have been together for so long and it just works and there is trust there. I 
would think, I really think that is the foundation of our group, our organization. I have 
been with them 6 years…I have never felt the need for a contract…and [Executive 
Director G] is so open.  She always checks in with the entire board saying, “these are my 
thoughts, what do you think” and we trust her. She is an intelligent woman and is 
passionate about what she does.” 
\         (Board Member G) 
 
Case study 8 “Remote Control” (FFI Score 4) 
Not all organizations were centralized geographically.  Some organizations served areas 




often made via teleconference.  Interestingly, this organization was in the process of hiring a new 
executive director at the time of the interview.  Responses were timely, topical, and reflective 
given the nature of the upcoming hire.   
 
Contracts 
 The Executive Director at this organization does not have a contract.   There are, 
however, written job responsibilities.  As Executive Director H stated regarding the written 
responsibilities, “They are pretty standard in relation to nonprofits. They are well researched.” 
When asked to elaborate, they continued, “there’s an oversight of operations, company 
operations, there is assistance with…the board with their governance” (Board Member H).  
There was a mismatch in responses regarding the contractual obligations between the 
executive director’s and the board.  When asked about contracts, Board Member H stated,  “I 
actually don’t know what those look like… we’re really kind of a hands-off board.  That’s why 
we hire an ED. That’s her job, his or her job.”  She elaborated: 
 
Right now currently it’s a her job.  So I don’t...personally I don’t think I have even read 
through them. I think I have read a couple...I have read the employee ones but that was it. 
Her contract, you know, it is mostly just employee stuff.  What her job position is going 
to be and telling work performance…correction procedures, that kind of stuff in it. So, all 
that stuff is just employee law kind of stuff. 







 Curiously, when Executive Director H was asked to speak to how performance 
monitoring occurs within the agency, they stated, “Unfortunately, it’s not really. It’s not really 
monitored.”  While this response may indicate frustration with a lack of performance review 
(highlighted later), when asked to elaborate, they responded: 
 
I guess what is monitored is the activities that I report to the board. So, I give a very in-
depth ED’s Report that I present to the Board during the monthly Board meetings.  From 
that they can see the activities of the organization. You know the number of clients we 
are serving, the number of events that we participate in.  They are provided with our 
evaluation reports.  
 
Board Member H’s response hints at the importance of selective transfer within an organization.  
More specifically, since information must be selectively transferred, principle/agent potential 
conflicts ought to be kept in mind when selecting the topics and items for regular exchange.  The 
executive director continued: 
 
I include, you know, anything from social media, new projects, personnel updates, 
collaborations, community partnerships, trainings, and events- not just ones that we are 
participating in, but that we host. It’s a very in depth ED’s report so from there they can 
see the activities that I am overseeing and that I am involved in. 
        (Executive Director H) 




Clearly, this represents a very thorough presentation system.  When explored further it 
became apparent that the lack of monitoring was stated to occur not in a lack of information 
presented, but in a lack of discerning attention placed upon it by a busy board afterwards.     
When asked what they hold themselves accountable to produce that no one checks on, they 
responded:  
 
Compliance – grant compliance, accounting, and financial standards.  I work closely not 
just with my bookkeeper but with our auditor to ensure that we are meeting all of our 
fiscal and accounting standards and our audits have been very clean, no findings over the 
last few years. So, my accountabilities is based on my own standards of meeting 
regulation and contract requirement. 
        (Executive Director H) 
 
For board members, monitoring was stated to occur as follows: 
 
I don’t know if there actually a specific monitoring system that we use.  You are basically 
monitored if you come to the meeting, if you show up…  But I don’t think there is any 
formal process that we do to monitor each other. I think it is pretty informal…most 
organizations are just happy to have board members. 
        (Board Member H) 
 
Performance Review 





I am just going to touch on this because we have a little bit of time. I have been working 
for nonprofits for 20 years. I have been Program Director, Interim ED, the first ED for a 
start-up nonprofit, and I have been with [redacted] for going on 7 years.  [redacted] is the 
only nonprofit that has not reviewed me. It has not provided me with a performance 
review…I’ve done what I can do to encourage it and provide the information, but it just 
hasn’t happened. 
         (Executive Director H) 
 
In a similar vein, the Executive Director H responded that there was no policy for 
conducting a review and that performance targets “are known to me.  I am not sure if they are 
known to the board.”  When asked what happens when goals are met, they responded.  “Personal 
fulfillment and the satisfaction and benefits come from knowing that the community has been 
served and people who have the needs we serve, you know, needs are being met.” 
Speaking first to the composition of the board, it was noted that more that 50% of the 
board members were parents of those in their target service population.  Accordingly, many 
board members were very occupied in the caretaking of their ill children.  Executive Director H 
believed that this had a significant impact on the amount of oversight the board was capable of 
creating. 
 
They are clear to me. I am not quite sure if they are clear to them…. Oftentimes the 
individuals who serve on the Board [redacted] who have the greatest passion for the work 




busy working and supporting their family. So, the amount of time they provide is very 
limited.  
So, I think that one of the reasons why there has been limited effort to, you know 
evaluation, performance review, ED and all that. I think it has much to do with capacity 
of the individuals that are serving on the Board. 
       (Executive Director H)  
 
 Executive Director H did state that monitoring was done once a year at their annual 
retreat.  “Last year it was two nights that we did it-so a total of 6-10 hours where we actually sit 
down and go through everything.  So that is the biggest time where we actually evaluate.  
         (Board Member H) 
Summary 
 This organization was interesting because there were indications that the executive 
director felt there was very little actual oversight, very little actual performance evaluation, and 
very little monitoring and yet the structures for these activities were discussed at length.  It 
highlights the idea of administrative attention being a critical ingredient in the successful 
implementation of checks and safeguards. 
 It appears that the board had difficulty maintaining administrative focus as the 
composition was made of up very busy individuals.  There appeared to be ample attention paid to 
the organization during the board retreat.  There was heavy focus on the board retreat serving as 
a touch stone for board self-evaluation.  This organization certainly related that the executive 







 Three findings emerged from this research.  The primary finding is that MSA, rather than 
Agency Theory or Stewardship Theory, robustly accounts for qualitative data obtained and 
evaluated in this study.  Two secondary findings identified include:  1. A novel application of 
Kingdon’s Multiple Streams framework to explain the emergence of formalized features such as: 
contracts, written performance evaluations, and bonuses) in nonprofit organizations.  2.) The 
identification of core thematic elements underlying principal/agent dynamics in nonprofit board 
governance.  All findings present the opportunity for additional research, growth, and 
development for board governance in the future. 
 
Primary Finding 
This research began looking at Agency Theory, in its most traditional sense.  
Unsurprisingly in retrospect, the goodness-of-fit of the data aligned with newer iterations of 
Agency Theory especially BAM.  In fact, when not forced to make a dichotomous selection 
between Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory, BAM best fits the responses received in the 
course of the research. 
As applied to nonprofit board governance, BAM includes many of the externalized 
variables often associated with family-owned firms and benefit corporations.  It includes non-
rational influences such as inequity aversion, extrinsic motivations, intrinsic motivations, and 
time discounting (Pepper & Gore, 2015, p. 1057). 
As seen in the following table, the data obtained in this research interacts with the Pepper 




Figure 1 Agent's job performance and work cycle (Pepper and Gore, 2015) 
 
 While goal setting wasn’t explored deeply in the interviews, contracting and monitoring 
were discussed in detail.  Each of the respondents spoke to the importance of contracting, 
monitoring, feedback, and rewards.  The inclusion of other factors, including intrinsic 
motivations, captured in the research by asking respondents what they make sure they do that no 
one checks on, is critical to account for the observed responses.  Responses given clearly include 
known and included factors in BAM but otherwise discounted or ignored in classical Agency 
Theory with its rational man focus.   
 Pepper and Gore discuss assumptions about the nature of actors in both theories.  In their 
2015 work, they highlight that agent’s motivations in classical Economic Man assume “no 
nonpecuniary agent motivation.”  Additionally, within BAM, this assumption is rejected and 
replaced with an assumption that presumes motivations are “both intrinsic and extrinsic; intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation are neither independent nor additive” (Pepper & Gore, 2015, p. 1050). 




As summarized by Pepper and Gore (2015), Eisenhardt was quite explicit when putting 
forward two propositions related to traditional positive Agency Theory.  In the first, “when the 
contract between principal and agent is outcome based, the agent is more likely to behave in the 
interests of the principle” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 60).  In the second, “when the principle has 
information to verify agent behavior, the agent is more likely to behave in the interests of the 
principles” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 60).  
 With BAM, the model rejects several Agency Theory tenets.  Most notably, it does not 
assume rationality.  Similarly, we will see that Kindgon’s Multiple Streams Approach also does 
not begin with an assumption of rationale behavior making.  What follows in BAM is the 
incorporation of other considerations agents take into account when making decisions regarding 
risk.  Whereas Agency Theory “places less emphasis on the objective of the motivating agents to 
perform to the best of their ability than it does on aligning the interests of agents and principals” 
(Pepper & Gore, 2015, p. 1048), BAM includes considerations of “human capital, motivation (in 
particular, intrinsic motivation) (Pepper & Gore, 2015, p. 1048).   
 There are several aspects of BAM particularly relevant in this context.  Intrinsic 
motivations manifesting in the agent but being directed toward the good of the agency-
specifically in the nonprofit and public sectors (Besley & Ghatak, 2005).  While the work of 
Besley and Ghatak clearly highlights the importance of mission as a factor at play, particularly in 
compensation considerations for agents, their work extends beyond the focus of this paper. 
Work by Lin, Lubatkim, and Wiseman (2010) extended BAM to include several 
variations of family firm structure addressing ownership dispersion.  While BAM fits well into 
family-firm relationships, given the pecuniary considerations brought into question with regards 








 The findings break down into two tracks organized as seen in the table below.  The first is 
formalization.  This is the formalization of behaviors associated with aligning interests in both 
Agency Theory and Behavioral Agency Modeling Theory.  In Behavioral Agency Modeling 
Theory, these results fit into the following table: 
 
Table 6 Formalization and Agency Theory analysis 
FINDINGS Formalization ≠ Addressing Principal/Agent Conflict 
Formalization Principal/Agent Conflict 
Explained 
by: 
Kingdon's MSA Thematic Elements 
Revealing Formal feature 
adoption 
Communication 












Aligning interests between principals and agents is complicated even in the best of 
circumstances. This is even more so when a firm cannot issue shares or stock to address potential 
issues of principal/agent conflict.   
Which theory, Agency or Stewardship, best accounts for what was observed?  In light of 
the data gathered, this question was naïve.  Neither perfectly fit the data nor does one rise above 
another to explain the observations.  In some ways, both theories explain the data.   In other 




examined.  The more important finding was that formalized features, such as contracts, 
performance review, and monitoring did not correlate with actual checking and safeguarding at 
the organizations.  Thematic comparison and Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach (MSA) 
better account for all observations. 
 
Formalization ≠ Addressing Principal/Agent Conflict 
 After transcribing and beginning the thematic analysis of the interviews, several points 
began to emerge.  First noticed was that there was a spectrum of formality across all 
organizations.  After consultation with several committee members, a framework was developed  
 In many cases, Never Again and Bespoke for example, there were reports of check and 
safeguard failures with previous executive directors, who operated under comparably equally 
formal structures.  This stood in contrast to other organizations, like Little Giant and Remote 
Control, which scored very low on their FFI scores, but simultaneously reported high levels of 
confidence in the checking and safeguarding of their principal/agent relationship.  After 
consultation with peers, Dr. Robert Randolph in particular, it became apparent detecting formal 
features within an agency was not the same saying the agency was effectively addressing 
principal/agent conflict.  This became an overarching finding related to all others as viewed in 
the table below. 
1. Formalization ≠ Addressing Principal/Agent Conflict 
 The first portion of the findings relates to formalized structures detected within each 
agency.  The interviews revealed a spectrum of formality, with Casino Royale on one end (most 
formal) and Remote Control (least formal).  While this may have been interesting in itself, it  




have appeared that Remote Control or Little Giant would be relatively unchecked and 
unsafeguarded, given the lack of formalized structures, what was found was that it did not 
matter.   
Specifically, when doing member checking with the Executive Director of Little Giant, 
the Executive Director reported that if the researcher had the idea that they were not being 
checked and safeguarded, they were 100% wrong.  They reported that they were closely and 
deeply engaged with the board, it just wasn’t formalized.  They highlighted, as they did in the 
initial interview, the importance of communication, availability, and trust.   
 Formalized features threatened to mask the relational nature of the executive 
director/board dynamic.  In cases where there was not much formality, the emotional/relational 
aspect was more easily discerned.  Where high levels of formality were encountered, the 
emotional aspect were not entirely muted, only less obvious.  In the responses from the 
interviews, this emotional underpinning was present in all relationships described as healthy, and 
not at all in relationships described as dysfunctional.   
In the cases where boards were recovering from previously dysfunctional relationships, 
formal structures were being developed as a possible solution.  It is as though the board noted 
that the executive director broke their promise and so they were going to make sure it didn’t 
happen again by instituting formalized structures.   
Of course, had these members been privy to the experiences of other agencies where 
executive directors failed to perform in the context of a formalized environment, they would 
likely realize the contract and regular review would not be the silver bullet they seemed to hope 




If the organizations could speak one-with-another, they might realize that the formalized 
structures really aren’t the solution.  Restoring the emotional connection is.  This connection 
emerged as the themes captured in the research and discussed in the thematic comparison.  First 
though, to account for the presence or absence of formalized structures, a MSA analysis follows. 
 
Multiple Streams Approach accounts for formalization 
 Breaking down the findings, we will first take note of the Formalization column of the 
Findings section as seen in the table below.  In this table, Formalization is explained best by 
Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach (MSA).   
The five components of MSA are The Problem Stream, The Policy Stream, The Politics 
Stream, Policy Windows, and Policy Entrepreneurs.  What follows is an exploration of these 
concepts as applied to the data gathered. 
 
The problem stream. 
In the case of nonprofit boards and their executive directors, numerous problems can be 
said to exist. At the largest organizational level, there may be concerns with regards to 
fundraising, program performance, grant compliance, human resource issues, and public 
perception.  More specifically, there is the possibility that the board can turn its problem 
identifying capabilities upon itself and recognize that misalignment between the board’s interests 
and the executive director’s interests  This potential misalignment (principal/agent conflict) and 






The policy stream. 
The Policy stream may be better stated as the governance stream when applied in this 
way.  There are numerous governance options to address the host of problems circulating within 
the problems stream.  In this case, formalization emerges as a potential governance solution to 
address the potential for miscommunication of expectation or misalignment of goals with 
nonprofit boards. 
The politics stream. 
In MSA, the Politics Stream is vulnerable to certain shifts such as turnover.  In the case 
of nonprofit boards, this is certainly at play.  Moreover, the politics stream is said to be sensitive 
to public opinion and pressure groups.  It is quite likely that internal lobbying efforts by several 
board members could constitute this sort of pressure. 
 
Policy windows and policy entrepreneurs. 
Policy Windows and Policy Entrepreneurs are the last of the 5 components of MSA.  
“Policy windows sometimes open in the problem stream, when a focusing event rapidly attracts 
attention to a problem creating an urgency to act” (Henstra, 2010, p. 245).  This was certainly the 
case in Never Again where the organization’s crisis led to a desire to apply a solution from the 
policy stream.  Sometimes, windows open initially in the politics stream when turnover creates 
new feasibilities and alliances. 
Finally, the Policy Entrepreneur is seen in motivated board chairs or particularly 
engaged/concerned board members.  Sometimes, as was seen in Remote Control, the executive 




this case, it was not successful without board support.  The entrepreneur was unable to couple the 
streams. 
 
Table 7 Modified Interpretation (Jones et al.,2015) 
MSA hallmark Standard Policy Formation 
MSA (Jones et al., 2015) 
Board Governance examples 
Problem Stream 
Indicators How actors identify and 
monitor potential problems, 
including metrics measuring 
the relative severity of a given 
problem (such as 
unemployment 
rates, and increasing costs), and 
a virtually endless array of 
rates, ratios, 
and anecdotes. 
Annual revenue, number of new donors, 
number of HR incidents, program 
recidivism rates, changes in insurance 
rates, etc 
Focusing Events Are attached to particular 
problems, providing powerful 
impetus for action or change. A 
few notable focusing 
events that increased attention 
and recognizably preceded 
policy change include the 
9/11 terrorist attacks, 3-Mile 
Island nuclear accident, and the 
Columbine shootings. 
Media reports of failure, anecdotes of 
program success/failure, losing a major 
grant, failing to meet grant reporting and 
tax filing deadlines 
Feedback Information provided by 
analogous programs 
related to the problem of 
interest. For example, one 
might reasonably 
use the success of policies 
designed to mitigate the 
pollutants that cause acid 
rain to later provide a structure 
for regulating carbon to 
mitigate climate 
change. 
Comparisons with other nonprofit 
organizations for overhead targets, 




Load The capacity of institutions to 
deal with problems. If 
policymakers are 
dealing with all-consuming or 
numerous problems, then a 
new problem’s ability 
to nudge its way into the 
purview of policymakers is 
negligible. 
Managing HR, fundraising, donor 
relations, program activities, media 
relations, board recruitment, succession 
planning, etc. 
Politics Stream 
Ideology Refers to the 
aggregate orientation of the 
political parties within relevant 
institutions. 
Various idea and perspectives with 
respect to what a nonprofit board should 
do. 
Mood Refers to the general 
orientation of the public toward 
issues, values, or solutions 
relevant to the policy problem. 
Most comparable as morale and 
perceptions of trust with fellow board 
members and the executive director 
Interests Refers to the aggregate position 
of relevant interests, including 
arrayed advocacy groups and 
other actors interested in a 
particular problem. 
Operating at the individual level, these 
would include areas of particular focus in 
the governance space (ie. Pet projects, 
areas of expertise or previous failure). 
Policy Stream 
Value Acceptability Likelihood for a proposal to 
conform to existing value 
constraints. 
Questions mission drift, appropriate use 
of donor constrained funding, 
acceptability of grant dependency 
Technical 
Feasibility 
Possessing the technical ability 
to create and/or implement the 
proposal. 
Questions regarding the ability of the 
nonprofit to execute board directives.  
Capacity related questions 
Resource Adequacy The obtainability of resources 
to enact the proposal. 
Can board directives be executed with 
available funds, board or staff 
manpower, and executive director 
bandwidth 
Network Integration The way in which policy 
communities are interrelated. 
This manifests itself as board members 
and various constellations of alliances 
interact to achieve change 
Policy Community The actors which disseminate 
ideas and cause their 
proliferation or extinction. 
This is the entire board, including 
individuals and aligned groupings of 
board members in the process of 
governance 
Policy Window 
Coupling logic The logic or arguments used to 
couple streams 
Reasoning for combining solutions with 
problems within the organization at the 




Decision style The amount of information 
needed before a decision can be 
made 
Waiting to act on hiring a grant writer 
until additional budget information and 





Resources Time and money An influential board member may 
bankroll several prominent programs 
Access Access to decision makers Does the chair have access to prominent 
funders and with staff surrounding the 
executive director. 
Strategies Includes efforts to manipulate 
and couple the 
streams ranging from 
bargaining to communication 
framing. 
This would include agenda setting, 
persuasion, assigned tasks, budget 
evaluation, and discussion. 
 
 
2. Low-level, Mid-level, and High-level Themes 
 24 distinct themes emerged during the research.  These themes, coded after deep 
immersion and consideration of the data, were then meta-compared one with another in various 
constellations to derive overarching mid-level and high-level themes.  These overarching themes 
lend themselves toward additional discussion follows along with an exploration of implications 
with regards to the literature and to pedagogical methodologies to improve board performance in 
the field. 
 Once identified, these themes were internally cross-checked for common emerging meta-
thematic elements.  Concerning the checks and safeguards at play in the relationship between the 









Trust was identified early on as both a spoken and apparent theme in the relationship 
between executive directors and their boards.  It appeared as a certainty that a person would do 
what they would said they would do.  When it was said to be misplaced, it was in reference to 
failures of judgement and character, not performance.  
Selective transfer of information emerged as a repeated theme.  The volume of information 
handled by the directors of the agencies was so massive that selection had to occur before being 
passed to the board.  In certain cases, during the considerations of salary, boards also selectively 
transferred information with their respective executive directors. 
Formalization was seen throughout the interviews.  Formalization appeared generally as 
supposed solutions to challenges in managing principal/agent conflict.  It was not thought to be a 
solution in itself, but was assumed by most parties to serve as an effective safeguard against 
principal/agent conflict. 
Several agencies spoke of contracts as tools for clarity.  In the cases where trust was said to 
have existed between executive directors and their boards and where organizations possessed 
high FFI scores, contracts were mentioned as being utilized to enhance clarity and understanding 
between parties. 
Compliance emerged as a measure of performance among all agencies.  Compliance was 
mentioned in reference to tax status, grant compliance, and state regulation.  From a fiduciary 
perspective, compliance is a key component of both the duty of care and the duty of obedience. 
It was not lost on most parties that the relationship entered into by executive directors and 
their boards placed them in a position of Vulnerability.  Specifically, the ability to lose one’s 




agencies.  In certain cases, agencies spoke of sore wounds with previous malfeasance or 
misfeasance by prior leaders. 
Among several agencies, the ability to safely request help when needed was discussed as an 
important component of the relationship between the executive directors and their boards.  
Oversight without formalization was also acknowledged as a recurrent theme in the literature.  In 
some cases, particularly with organizations with reported high levels of trust, oversight was said 
to exist though without high levels of formalization. 
Board composition and the how preoccupied board members were with other responsibilities 
was reported as a concern speaking to bandwidth.  Concerns over bandwidth were universal by 
both the executive directors and their boards. 
Some agencies spoke to board attention.  Board attention was even mentioned as sometimes 
needing to precede executive director attention to promote executive scrutiny on certain issues.  
Another them was that nearly all responsibilities were viewed as belonging to the executive 
director.  All agencies interviewed had paid executive directors with unpaid board members.   
At the end of the day, what works is king.  Most agencies focused on reflections of agency 
performance as measured by public or client perception.  Getting things done with limited 
resources was stated as an ultimate and overriding goal. 
In cases where there had been issues with the relationship between executive directors and 
their boards, Mismatched perceptions were sometimes said to be a cause.  In some cases, the 
board interpreted information differently than the executive director intended it.  Clarification 
and restatement would likely address this particular concern well. 
Another theme emerged which was reliance upon formalization to guarantee oversight.  In 




place at the time of the interview.  In other agencies, there was an inability to sustain high levels 
of oversight.  This may be one of the most dangerous assumptions that emerged from the 
responses.  When viewed across agencies, formalization does not guarantee oversight. 
Origination of new governance structures emerged as a thematic feature.  Some 
organizations had access to sufficient institutional memory to recall and report the way in which 
governance structures emerged.  Others openly admitted where there were gaps in the 
administrative record.  
In cases where there had been recent ruptures in trust, lessons learned the hard way emerged 
as a repeated theme and caution.  Both executive directors and their board members repeatedly 
cautioned against making the same mistakes again.  This was a primary concern among agencies 
with new directors at the helms. 
Organizations sometimes recognized and reported that formalization needed to be 
demonstrated both in name and practice.  In certain cases, it emerged as a theme in the negative 
where formalization existed in name but not practice.  In either case, the theme was present even 
if not so literally stated. 
In most cases, formalization, in the absence of attention leads, to variable results.  This was 
clear with several agencies where formalized features were present, but unaccounted for by the 
boards or were ignored/unknown to the executive directors. 
Deliberate formalization to was sometimes instituted to ensure performance.  Rather than 
being put into place to stop a misdeed, they were put into place to maintain positive performance 




Engagement was viewed by some agencies as a suitable surrogate of performance.  This was 
especially true of the board members who highlighted the first responsibility on most boards is 
just to show up. 
When viewed from a distance, it became clear that every board is different.  Respondents 
themselves recognized that there existed distinct cultures within their agency and under different 
leadership regimes. 
It was not always clear that agencies had a mutual understanding of what the responsibilities 
of the executive director are and what they aren’t.  Several agencies gave incompatible answers 
when asked about responsibilities of the certain organization tasks and metrics.    
Depending upon the service area of the participating organizations, the roles of credentialing 
agencies to disseminate and mandate application of best practices of board management was 
mentioned.  This is an interesting trait to recognize, especially in the agencies with larger 
budgets that can afford to maintain credentialing. 
Transparency, when held against an objective standard, was recognized by some as how one 
best measures progress towards the realization of the strategic plan.  Nearly all agencies spoke 
about transparency as a key indicator and requirement for positive outcomes in their 
administrative spaces.   
These 24 themes, when analyzed and compared one-with-another, yielded the following 
9-common areas.  Clarity/Mismatch, Information Selection, Safe Requests for help, 
Formalization, Concern, Oversight, Trust, Vulnerability, and Forgiveness.  These mid-level 
themes represent the common denominator themes of the 24 listed above as identified from each 




 In cases where formalized features were already at play, adapting approaches were either 
said to be difficult or not generally attempted (Green Giant and Little Giant).  It may be said that 
the organizational culture possessed inertia which proved to be a hindrance to make proposed 
changes.  In many cases, procedures and perspectives had been set by previous boards and 
previous EDs and seldom reexamined.   
 Finally, the 9-common areas were again analyzed and compared one-with-another to 
identify 3-high level themes present in the responses of those interviewed with regards to checks 
and safeguards addressing the relationship between the executive director and the board of 
directors.   
 
High-level Thematic elements 
• Communication- Communication arose as a meta-thematic element when aggregating 
emergent subthemes.  These themes expressed congruency around communication and 
informed respondent’s feelings of being checked and safeguarded. 
o Clarity/Mismatch- When compared one against the other, there was a clear 
emergent theme of clarity and mismatch.  The reality was that in many cases 
executive directors and boards were not on the same page.  Even worse, they 
often didn’t know it.  It was only through interviews across roles that the 
mismatches became apparent. 
o Information Selection- In all cases, executive directors expressed that they could 
not relate all business details through to the board.  In most cases, it was the 




o Safe requests for help- Interestingly, as a theme, the ability to reach out either 
direction emerged.  Executive directors would reach out to their boards when 
necessary and boards could reach out to the executive directors when they lacked 
critical information. 
 
Table 8 High-level Thematic element (Communication) 
 
• Concern- Concern emerged as a meta-thematic element comprised of formalization, 
concern, and oversight.  It speaks to many issues simultaneously.  When concern was felt 
and expressed, leaders felt mutually checked and safeguarded.    
o Formalization- Formalized features played prominently in the responses given 
due to the nature of the questions being explored.  Formalization, for what it is 
















o Concern- Concern wasn’t expected but emerged from comparisons for responses 
and agency reports.  This was a less-obviously tangible yet widely expressed need 
in the organization.  This was especially true for the executive directors who gave 
a great deal or importance to board members being as concerned for the 
organizations as they themselves were.  
o Oversight- Oversight emerged as a higher order theme related to the techniques 




Table 9 High-level Thematic Element (Concern) 
 
 
• Safety-  The meta-thematic element safety emerged comprised of trust, vulnerability, and 
forgiveness.  Regardless of the presence or absence of formalized features, it was safety 

























o Trust-  Trust emerged as an overarching theme encompassing several related 
themes.  Specifically, it was reported as confidence that one would deliver on 
their promises.  It is intimately tired to vulnerability, as it is from vunerable 
situations that yield positive outcomes that trust is born.   
o Vulnerability- The ability to be wrong and be safe was reported and emerged as a 
theme.  The sense of safety in vulnerable spaces was not taken for granted and 
those who reported it reported it with much appreciation and gratitude. 
o Forgiveness-  Two themes were represented in forgiveness.  Where trust and 
safety existed, there was room for error, learning, and improvement.  In agencies 
that were confident in their leaders’ capacities, there was forgiveness for 








































































 There are two calls to action resulting from this study.  The first is an imploring of 
nonprofit boards to inventory formalized governance features in use in their agencies.  The 
reason for this is three-fold.  The first reason is that formalized features should be noticed so they 
can be assessed for efficacy and goodness of fit in the organization.  Secondly, the organization 
should take note of which formalized features are in place and institutionally focus on the reason 
they exist in the organization.  The answer to why certain features exist ought to be more than 
“because it’s always been done that way.”  Once an inventory has been made and the reasoning 
brought to light, the third reason, can be instituted. The board can determine if there are other 
formal features that ought to be enacted or if there are some that may be done away with.  In 
doing so, the organization may then also focus on the more important relational aspects of the 
board/executive director dynamic.  By focusing on the improving communication, demonstrating 
concern, and enriching the dynamic with trust and safety.   The second call to action, proposed is 
the introduction of a system from Emotional Focused Therapy EFT (Designed to facilitate 
healthy relationships) to address this need.   
Communication, concern, and safety arose as the pinnacle drivers of the relationship 
between executive directors and their boards of directors.  The second call to action is to further 
explore the applicability of an organizational type of Emotionally Focused Therapy (EFT).  
Stemming from ground-breaking work focused on improving relationships in a psycho-
therapeutic clinical setting by Sue Johnson (2008), EFT acknowledges the importance of the 
social capital between parties.  More importantly, it calls for methods and approaches 
demonstrated to rebuild and strengthen inter-personal relations.  Accessibility, responsiveness, 




which specifically addresses the three thematic elements identified in this study (communication, 
concern, and safety). 
The relationship between the board of directors and executive director is an emotional 
and cognitive one.  To address the emotional, boards should focus on being (A.R.E.): 
 
 Accessible- Essentially, the board should “be there” when the executive 
director needs them and visa-versa. 
 Responsive- This behavior is seen in the field as being present and 
supportive during good times and hard times both.  Little Giant 
exemplified this in their board and executive director approaches. 
 Engaged- This behavior is felt and seen. It is accomplished through the 
deliberate application of attention to the needs of the executive director.  It 
is evident when the executive director and board members feels valued 
and appreciated 
 
Each component of A.R.E. addresses an analogous feature identified in the thematic 
review.  Principally, Accessibility addresses Communication, Responsiveness addresses Safety, 
and Engagement Addresses Concern.  It is proposed that these core components of EFT can 
improve the underlying aspects of the board/executive director relationship and yield the 
checking and safeguarding desired from the outset.  It is my hope this insight spurs research and 





Initially, the question was:  What theory (Agency or Stewardship) best accounts for the 
observed practices and perspectives between nonprofit executive directors and their boards?  
While some aspects of governance in the nonprofits interviewed could be well described with 
one or the other, no one theory arose to explain all aspects considered.  The short answer 
therefore is:  Neither. 
 
What I discovered is that, at its core, the dynamic between executive directors and their 
boards is relational.  It is a human relationship…and there are ways to improve human 
relationships. 
 
 This does not mean to say that either theory is derelict or lacks utility.  Behavioral 
Agency Theory was certainly more aligned and brought into consideration social costs, checks 
and safeguards not specifically formalized, and the relational aspect of contracts as explored 
here.  Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach was newly applied in the literature to account for 
governance approaches in context of nonprofit boards.  Finally, thematic comparisons revealed 
foundational aspects of the executive director/board dynamic:  Communication, concern, and 
safety.   
  
Limitations 
Small sample size and generalizability   
The limitation to generalizability is the small sample size and non-random sampling of the 
respondents.  While the agencies were chosen carefully and deliberately, they were not 




future research, questions relating to the operability of MSA in nonprofit board governance could 
be surveyed for with larger samples.  Furthermore, new instruments could be designed for this 
purpose following the insights from this research.  Given the paper was designed to explore 
deeper, less well-explored knowledge in the minds of the respondents, this was the appropriate 
sampling for this work.   
 
Agency Diversity   
While the variability of the agencies in size and structure added diversity to the findings, 
outliers may be mistakenly take as common.  In future research, agencies of varying sizes and 
sector participation could be surveyed for the presence of unnoticed formalized features and 
culture governance windows 
 
Geographical constraint 
It has been noted that the culture of nonprofit boards of directors may vary regionally.   The 
selection size may certainly be an issue in this space.  In order to explore the ideas presented in 




Being strictly qualitative, generalizability (in the conventional sense) is not readily 
achievable from this space.  With additional research, including a quantitative design following 






 There is probably no more humbling experience than realizing how naïve one’s approach 
was at the beginning of a great journey.  This researcher began expecting to see an “either/or” 
situation when analyzing checks and safeguards within nonprofit organizations.  It was believed 
that either Agency Theory or Stewardship Theory would better account for checks and 
safeguards in place in select nonprofit organizations. This was not the case.  What was observed 
was did not perfectly fit one or-the-other of these two (now recognizably false) dichotomies.  
What was observed was a confluence of trust, concern, communication, and a belief in certain 
cases by certain people that formalization is a solution to principal/agent conflict.  
Checks and safeguards in the relationship between executive directors and their boards 
ought not to cloud the truer relational partnership that exists between them.  There is no 
substitute for positive, effective, relational partnerships.  In some cases, highly regimented 
executive directors with contractual bonds still managed to fail-to-perform year after year.  In 
other cases, completely at-will executive directors managed to outperform and impress very 
engaged boards.   
What I initially thought would be an exploration of trust with its sinister temptress- 
abdication; or scrutiny with its slippery slope toward abject micro-management was neither.   
The reality was that we were looking at deep underlying interpersonal themes and features of 
formalization.  I urge that we begin to pay attention to the cultures in which we find ourselves.  
Notice what you are not noticing.  It is extremely difficult to address that which you have not yet 
noticed yourself doing. 
I began the dissertation by highlighting a nonprofit whose board was essentially 




contract in place.  The very notion that a contract could have prevented it is exactly what did not 
occur.  The contract enabled the manipulation of the system and the breaking of the principal’s 
interests from the agent’s.  The system broke down despite the appearance of safeguarding 
procedures being in place.  It was the exact opposite of what I thought I’d see in the study.  I 
learned that, while my perspective was mistaken from the outset, there was ample learning to be 






































APPENDIX A   




Informed consent  
School of Public Policy and Leadership 
    
Title of Study: Hearts and Minds:  An analysis of checks & safeguards, monitoring, and 
performance review of executive boards and their executive directors within select Southern 
Nevada nonprofit organizations. 
Investigator(s): John M. Wagner MPA 
For questions or concerns about the study, you may contact John Wagner at 
john.wagner@unlv.edu.   
 
For questions regarding the rights of research subjects, any complaints or comments regarding 
the manner in which the study is being conducted, contact the UNLV Office of Research 
Integrity – Human Subjects at 702-895-2794, toll free at 877-895-2794 or via email at 
IRB@unlv.edu. 
    
 
Purpose of the Study 
You are invited to participate in a research study.  The purpose of these study is to explore 
organizational checks and safeguards: such as contracts, monitoring, and performance review at 
certain nonprofit organizations. 
 
Participants 
You are being asked to participate in the study because you fit this criteria: You are an executive 
director, or sit on the board of directors, of a nonprofit organization. 
 
Procedures  
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to do the following: 1. Respond to 
interview questions and offer your opinions on matters relating to the contracts, monitoring, and 
performance review practices at your organization.   
 
Benefits of Participation  
There will be no direct benefits to you as a participant in this study.  However, we hope to learn 
how boards and executive directors interact with each other how contracts, performance 
monitoring, and performance reviews operate within certain nonprofit organizations. 
 
Risks of Participation  
There are risks involved in all research studies. This study may include only minimal risks.  






Cost /Compensation   
There will be no financial cost to you to participate in this study.  The study will take less than 1-





All information gathered in this study will be kept as confidential as possible.  No reference will 
be made in the final presentation of written or oral materials that could link you to this study.  All 
records will be stored in a locked facility at UNLV for two-years after completion of the study.  
After the storage time, the information gathered (both physical and electronic) will be 
destroyed/permanently deleted.  
 
Voluntary Participation  
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate in this study or in any 
part of this study.  You may withdraw at any time without prejudice to your relations with 
UNLV. You are encouraged to ask questions about this study at the beginning or any time during 
the research study.  
 
Participant Consent:  
I have read the above information and agree to participate in this study.  I have been able to ask 
questions about the research study.  I am at least 18 years of age.  A copy of this form has been 




             
Signature of Participant                                             Date  
 
        






I agree to be audio or video taped for the purpose of this research study. 
 
             
Signature of Participant                                             Date  
 








EMAIL RECRUIMENT COPY 
 
Participant Name (Please Print)                                           
 
Recruitment email script: 
 
My name is John Wagner and I am conducting research on the relationship between executive 
directors and their boards of directors of non-profit organizations.  While this an incredibly vital 
and important relationship, it is an area of academic literature that is not well-studied.  
 
I would like to ask for your help to enrich this body of knowledge in this space.  The goal is to 
explore organizational checks and safeguards: such as contracts, monitoring, and performance 
review.  I would like to set-up an in-person interview, first with you, then with one of your board 
members, to discuss these topics.   
 
Your responses will be made unidentifiable in the final report.  I thank you for your time and 
consideration and hope to hear from you to schedule an interview.  It is expected that the 
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